Strategy : an introduction to game theory / Joel Watson.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Preface -- 1. Introduction -- Noncooperative Game Theory -- Contract and Cooperative Game Theory -- The Meaning of "Game" -- Part I. Representing Games -- 2. The Extensive Form -- Other Examples and Conventions -- Exercises -- 3. Strategies -- Exercises -- 4. The Normal Form -- Classic Normal-Form Games -- Interpretation of the Normal Form -- Exercises -- 5. Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Utility -- Exercises -- Part II. Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings -- 6. Dominance and Best Response -- Dominance -- The First Strategic Tension and the Prisoners' Dilemma -- The Concept of Efficiency -- Best Response -- Dominance and Best Response Compared -- Exercises -- 7. Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance -- The Second Strategic Tension -- Exercises -- 8. Location and Partnership -- A Location Game -- A Partnership Game: Strategic Complementarities -- Exercises -- 9. Congruous Strategies and Nash Equilibrium -- Congruous Sets -- Nash Equilibrium -- Equilibrium of the Partnership Game -- Coordination and Social Welfare -- The Third Strategic Tension -- Aside: Behavioral Game Theory -- Exercises -- 10. Oligopoly, Tariffs, and Crime and Punishment -- Cournot Duopoly Model -- Bertrand Duopoly Model -- Tariff Setting by Two Countries -- A Model of Crime and Police -- Exercises -- 11. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- Exercises -- 12. Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies -- Exercises -- 13. Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings -- Complete Contracting in Discretionary Environments -- Contracting with Court-Imposed Breach Remedies -- Exercises -- Part III. Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings -- 14. Details of the Extensive Form -- Exercises -- 15. Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection -- Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction -- Subgame Perfection -- Exercises -- 16. Topics in Industrial Organization -- Advertising and Competition -- A Model of Limit Capacity -- Dynamic Monopoly -- Price Guarantees as a Commitment to High Prices -- Exercises -- 17. Parlor Games -- Exercises -- 18. Bargaining Problems -- Bargaining: Value Creation and Division -- An Abstract Representation of Bargaining Problems -- An Example -- The Standard Bargaining Solution -- Exercises -- 19. Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games -- Ultimatum Games: Power to the Proposer -- Two-Period, Alternating-Offer Games: Power to the Patient -- Infinite-Period, Alternating-Offer Game -- Exercises -- 20. Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium -- Joint Decisions -- Negotiation Equilibrium -- Example: Contracting for High-Powered Incentives -- Exercises -- 21. Investment, Hold Up, and Ownership -- Hold Up Example -- Asset Ownership -- Exercises -- 22. Repeated Games and Reputation -- A Two-Period Repeated Game -- An Infinitely Repeated Game -- The Equilibrium Payoff Set with Low Discounting -- Exercises -- 23. Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill -- Dynamic Oligopoly and Collusion -- Enforcing International Trade Agreements -- Goodwill and Trading a Reputation -- Exercises -- Part IV. Information -- 24. Random Events and Incomplete Information -- Exercises -- 25. Risk and Incentives in Contracting -- Risk Aversion -- A Principal-Agent Game -- Exercises -- 26. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability -- Exercises -- 27. Trade with Incomplete Information -- Markets and Lemons -- Auctions -- Exercises -- 28. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- Conditional Beliefs about Types -- Sequential Rationality -- Consistency of Beliefs -- Equilibrium Definition -- Exercises -- 29. Job-Market Signaling and Reputation -- Jobs and School -- Reputation and Incomplete Information -- Exercises -- Appendices -- A. Review of Mathematics -- Sets -- Functions and Calculus -- Probability -- B. The Mathematics of Rationalizability -- Dominance, Best Response, and Correlated Conjectures -- Rationalizability Construction -- Exercises -- Index.

Machine converted from AACR2 source record.