Behavioral game theory : (Record no. 1141986)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 06053cam a22004454i 4500
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20221101182444.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 020826s2003 nyuab b 001 0 eng d
010 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER
LC control number 2002034642
011 ## - LINKING LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER [OBSOLETE]
Local cataloguing issues note BIB MATCHES WORLDCAT
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 0691090394
Qualifying information alk. paper
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9780691090399
Qualifying information alk. paper
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (OCoLC)50518630
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency DLC
Language of cataloging eng
Description conventions rda
Transcribing agency DLC
Modifying agency MUQ
-- BAKER
-- NLGGC
-- YDXCP
-- OCLCQ
-- BTCTA
-- UBA
-- OCLCG
-- IG#
-- HEBIS
-- DEBBG
-- AD#
-- OCL
-- YUS
-- ATU
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE
Authentication code pcc
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB144
Item number .C364 2003
082 00 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 330.015193
Edition number 21
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Camerer, Colin,
Dates associated with a name 1959-
Relator term author.
9 (RLIN) 411253
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Behavioral game theory :
Remainder of title experiments in strategic interaction /
Statement of responsibility, etc. Colin F. Camerer.
246 3# - VARYING FORM OF TITLE
Title proper/short title Behavioural game theory
246 3# - VARYING FORM OF TITLE
Title proper/short title Behavioural game theory :
Remainder of title Experiments in strategic interaction
264 #1 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture New York, N.Y. :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Russell Sage Foundation ;
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture Princeton, N.J. :
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Princeton University Press,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice [2003]
264 #4 - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice ©2003
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xv, 550 pages :
Other physical details illustrations, 1 map ;
Dimensions 24 cm.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Content type term text
Content type code txt
Source rdacontent
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
Source rdamedia
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
Source rdacarrier
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement The roundtable series in behavioral economics
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc. note Includes bibliographical references (pages 497-533) and index.
505 00 - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Miscellaneous information 1.
Title Introduction --
Miscellaneous information 1.1.
Title What is Game Theory Good For? --
Miscellaneous information 1.2.
Title Three Examples --
Miscellaneous information 1.3.
Title Experimental Regularity and Behavioral Game Theory --
Miscellaneous information App. A1.1.
Title Basic Game Theory --
Miscellaneous information App. A1.2.
Title Experimental Design --
Miscellaneous information 2.
Title Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games --
Miscellaneous information 2.1.
Title Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Basic Results --
Miscellaneous information 2.2.
Title Methodological Variables --
Miscellaneous information 2.3.
Title Demographic Variables --
Miscellaneous information 2.4.
Title Culture --
Miscellaneous information 2.5.
Title Descriptive Variables: Labeling and Context --
Miscellaneous information 2.6.
Title Structural Variables --
Miscellaneous information 2.7.
Title Trust Games --
Miscellaneous information 2.8.
Title Theory --
Miscellaneous information 3.
Title Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium --
Miscellaneous information 3.1.
Title Early Studies --
Miscellaneous information 3.2.
Title Modern Studies --
Miscellaneous information 3.3.
Title Subjective Randomization and Mixed Strategies --
Miscellaneous information 3.4.
Title Explicit Randomization --
Miscellaneous information 3.5.
Title Patent Race and Location Games with Mixed Equilibria --
Miscellaneous information 3.6.
Title Two Field Studies --
Miscellaneous information 4.
Title Bargaining --
Miscellaneous information 4.1.
Title Unstructured Bargaining --
Miscellaneous information 4.2.
Title Structured Bargaining --
Miscellaneous information 4.3.
Title Bargaining under Incomplete Information --
Miscellaneous information 5.
Title Dominance-Solvable Games --
Miscellaneous information 5.1.
Title Simple Dominance-Solvable Games --
Miscellaneous information 5.2.
Title Beauty Contest Games --
Miscellaneous information 5.3.
Title Games in Which Iterated Reasoning Decreases Payoffs --
Miscellaneous information 5.4.
Title When More Iteration is Better: The "Dirty Faces" Game --
Miscellaneous information 5.5.
Title The "Groucho Marx" Theorem in Zero-Sum Betting --
Miscellaneous information 5.6.
Title Structural Models of Decision Rules and Levels of Reasoning --
Miscellaneous information 5.7.
Title Theories --
Miscellaneous information App.
Title Raw Choices in Email Game and Additional Data --
Miscellaneous information 6.
Title Learning --
Miscellaneous information 6.1.
Title Theories of Learning --
Miscellaneous information 6.2.
Title Reinforcement Learning --
Miscellaneous information 6.3.
Title Belief Learning --
Miscellaneous information 6.4.
Title Imitation Learning --
Miscellaneous information 6.5.
Title Comparative Studies --
Miscellaneous information 6.6.
Title Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) Learning --
Miscellaneous information 6.7.
Title Rule Learning --
Miscellaneous information 6.8.
Title Econometric Studies of Estimation Properties --
Miscellaneous information 7.
Title Coordination --
Miscellaneous information 7.1.
Title Matching Games --
Miscellaneous information 7.2.
Title Asymmetric Players: Battle of the Sexes --
Miscellaneous information 7.3.
Title Market Entry Games --
Miscellaneous information 7.4.
Title Payoff-Asymmetric Order-Statistic Games --
Miscellaneous information 7.5.
Title Selecting Selection Principles --
Miscellaneous information 7.6.
Title Applications: Path-Dependence, Market Adoption, and Corporate Culture --
Miscellaneous information App.
Title Psycholinguistics --
Miscellaneous information 8.
Title Signaling and Reputation --
Miscellaneous information 8.1.
Title Simple Signaling Games and Adaptive Dynamics --
Miscellaneous information 8.2.
Title Specialized Signaling Games --
Miscellaneous information 8.3.
Title Reputation Formation --
Miscellaneous information 9.
Title Conclusion: What Do We Know, and Where Do We Go? --
Miscellaneous information 9.1.
Title Summary of Results --
Miscellaneous information 9.2.
Title Top Ten Open Research Questions --
Miscellaneous information App.
Title Design Details.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
588 ## - SOURCE OF DESCRIPTION NOTE
Source of description note Machine converted from AACR2 source record.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Game theory.
9 (RLIN) 318254
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Statistical decision
9 (RLIN) 324475
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Decision making.
9 (RLIN) 349814
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
Uniform title Roundtable series in behavioral economics.
9 (RLIN) 1045083
907 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT G, LDG (RLIN)
a .b10769183
b 23-03-18
c 27-10-15
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Book
945 ## - LOCAL PROCESSING INFORMATION (OCLC)
a 330.015193 CAM
g 1
i A411339B
j 0
l cmain
o -
p $106.68
q -
r -
s -
t 0
u 10
v 1
w 0
x 1
y .i11900702
z 29-10-15
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- b
-- c
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 23-03-18
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) m
First date, FD (RLIN) a
-- eng
-- nyu
-- 0
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Cost, normal purchase price Inventory number Total Checkouts Total Renewals Full call number Barcode Date last seen Date last checked out Copy number Cost, replacement price Price effective from Koha item type
        City Campus City Campus City Campus Main Collection 29/10/2015 106.68 i11900702 10 1 330.015193 CAM A411339B 12/06/2017 03/05/2017 1 106.68 30/10/2021 Book

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