Behavioral game theory : experiments in strategic interaction /
Camerer, Colin, 1959-
Behavioral game theory : experiments in strategic interaction / Behavioural game theory Behavioural game theory : Experiments in strategic interaction Colin F. Camerer. - xv, 550 pages : illustrations, 1 map ; 24 cm. - The roundtable series in behavioral economics . - Roundtable series in behavioral economics. .
Includes bibliographical references (pages 497-533) and index.
Introduction -- What is Game Theory Good For? -- Three Examples -- Experimental Regularity and Behavioral Game Theory -- Basic Game Theory -- Experimental Design -- Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games -- Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Basic Results -- Methodological Variables -- Demographic Variables -- Culture -- Descriptive Variables: Labeling and Context -- Structural Variables -- Trust Games -- Theory -- Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium -- Early Studies -- Modern Studies -- Subjective Randomization and Mixed Strategies -- Explicit Randomization -- Patent Race and Location Games with Mixed Equilibria -- Two Field Studies -- Bargaining -- Unstructured Bargaining -- Structured Bargaining -- Bargaining under Incomplete Information -- Dominance-Solvable Games -- Simple Dominance-Solvable Games -- Beauty Contest Games -- Games in Which Iterated Reasoning Decreases Payoffs -- When More Iteration is Better: The "Dirty Faces" Game -- The "Groucho Marx" Theorem in Zero-Sum Betting -- Structural Models of Decision Rules and Levels of Reasoning -- Theories -- Raw Choices in Email Game and Additional Data -- Learning -- Theories of Learning -- Reinforcement Learning -- Belief Learning -- Imitation Learning -- Comparative Studies -- Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) Learning -- Rule Learning -- Econometric Studies of Estimation Properties -- Coordination -- Matching Games -- Asymmetric Players: Battle of the Sexes -- Market Entry Games -- Payoff-Asymmetric Order-Statistic Games -- Selecting Selection Principles -- Applications: Path-Dependence, Market Adoption, and Corporate Culture -- Psycholinguistics -- Signaling and Reputation -- Simple Signaling Games and Adaptive Dynamics -- Specialized Signaling Games -- Reputation Formation -- Conclusion: What Do We Know, and Where Do We Go? -- Summary of Results -- Top Ten Open Research Questions -- Design Details. 1. 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. App. A1.1. App. A1.2. 2. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 2.7. 2.8. 3. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5. 3.6. 4. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 5. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. App. 6. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 6.7. 6.8. 7. 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.4. 7.5. 7.6. App. 8. 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 9. 9.1. 9.2. App.
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
0691090394 9780691090399
2002034642
Game theory.
Statistical decision
Decision making.
HB144 / .C364 2003
330.015193
Behavioral game theory : experiments in strategic interaction / Behavioural game theory Behavioural game theory : Experiments in strategic interaction Colin F. Camerer. - xv, 550 pages : illustrations, 1 map ; 24 cm. - The roundtable series in behavioral economics . - Roundtable series in behavioral economics. .
Includes bibliographical references (pages 497-533) and index.
Introduction -- What is Game Theory Good For? -- Three Examples -- Experimental Regularity and Behavioral Game Theory -- Basic Game Theory -- Experimental Design -- Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games -- Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Basic Results -- Methodological Variables -- Demographic Variables -- Culture -- Descriptive Variables: Labeling and Context -- Structural Variables -- Trust Games -- Theory -- Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium -- Early Studies -- Modern Studies -- Subjective Randomization and Mixed Strategies -- Explicit Randomization -- Patent Race and Location Games with Mixed Equilibria -- Two Field Studies -- Bargaining -- Unstructured Bargaining -- Structured Bargaining -- Bargaining under Incomplete Information -- Dominance-Solvable Games -- Simple Dominance-Solvable Games -- Beauty Contest Games -- Games in Which Iterated Reasoning Decreases Payoffs -- When More Iteration is Better: The "Dirty Faces" Game -- The "Groucho Marx" Theorem in Zero-Sum Betting -- Structural Models of Decision Rules and Levels of Reasoning -- Theories -- Raw Choices in Email Game and Additional Data -- Learning -- Theories of Learning -- Reinforcement Learning -- Belief Learning -- Imitation Learning -- Comparative Studies -- Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) Learning -- Rule Learning -- Econometric Studies of Estimation Properties -- Coordination -- Matching Games -- Asymmetric Players: Battle of the Sexes -- Market Entry Games -- Payoff-Asymmetric Order-Statistic Games -- Selecting Selection Principles -- Applications: Path-Dependence, Market Adoption, and Corporate Culture -- Psycholinguistics -- Signaling and Reputation -- Simple Signaling Games and Adaptive Dynamics -- Specialized Signaling Games -- Reputation Formation -- Conclusion: What Do We Know, and Where Do We Go? -- Summary of Results -- Top Ten Open Research Questions -- Design Details. 1. 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. App. A1.1. App. A1.2. 2. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. 2.7. 2.8. 3. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5. 3.6. 4. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 5. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. App. 6. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 6.7. 6.8. 7. 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.4. 7.5. 7.6. App. 8. 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 9. 9.1. 9.2. App.
Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
0691090394 9780691090399
2002034642
Game theory.
Statistical decision
Decision making.
HB144 / .C364 2003
330.015193