000			04260cam a2200457 i 4500
003			OCoLC
005			20221115142149.0
008			171204s2018 enk b 001 0 eng d
010			_a 2017961507
011			_aDirect search result
011			_aMARC Score : 10550(22450) : OK
011			_aField 082 : DDC : 190 has no edition code
020			_a0198797079 _qhardback
020			_a9780198797074 _qhardback
035			_a(OCoLC)1013827175
040			_aYDX _beng _erda _cYDX _dVA@ _dPTS _dOCLCF _dGSU _dTKN _dIBI _dUKMGB _dCOD _dGZN _dATU
050		4	_aBJ1012 _b.M36 2018
082	0	4	_a149.7 _223
099			_a149.7 MAN
245	0	4	_aThe many moral rationalisms / _cedited by Karen Jones and François Schroeter.
250			_aFirst edition.
264		1	_aOxford, United Kingdom ; _aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c2018.
264		4	_c©2018
300			_aviii, 309 pages ; _c24 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aIntroduction / François Schroeter, Karen Jones, Laura Schroeter -- Humanity as an end in itself / Julia Markovits -- Three kinds of moral rationalism / Michael Smith -- Constitutivism about reasons : autonomy and understanding / Karl Schafer -- Constructivism and the normativity of practical reason / Nicholas Southwood -- Moral requirements and permissions, and the requirements and permissions of reason / Sarah Buss -- Reasons and justifiability / Laura Schroeter, François Schroeter -- Rationalist metaphysics, semantics, and metasemantics / Mark van Roojen -- Naturalistic moral realism, rationalism, and non-fundamental epistemology / Tristram McPherson -- The motivating power of the a priori obvious / RamNeta -- Stupid Goodness / Garrett Cullity -- What does it take to act for moral reasons? / Alison Hills -- Towards a trajectory-dependent model of (human) rational agency / Karen Jones -- the limits of emotion in moral judgment / Joshua May.
520			_a"Moral rationalism takes human reason and human rationality to be the key elements in an explanation of the nature of morality, moral judgment, and moral knowledge. This volume explores the resources of this rich philosophical tradition. Thirteen original essays, framed by the editors' introduction, critically examine the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason, (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. The five essays in Part I ('Normativity') offer contemporary defences or reconstructions of Kant's attempt to ground the normative thesis, that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action, in the nature of practical reason and practical rationality. The four essays in Part II ('Epistemology & Meaning') consider the viability of claims to a priori moral knowledge. The authors of all four essays are sympathetic to a realist moral metaphysics, and thus forgo the straightforward constructivist road to apriority. The four essays in Part III ('Psychology') each grapple with the implications for rationalism of the role of emotions and unconscious processes in moral judgement and action. Together the essays demonstrate that moral rationalism identifies not a single philosophical position but rather a family of philosophical positions, which resemble traditional rationalism, as exemplified by Kant, to varying degrees."-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aEthics. _9317549
650		0	_aRationalism _xMoral and ethical aspects _9751974
650		0	_aJudgment (Ethics) _9319696
650		0	_aKnowledge, Theory of. _9319783
700	1		_aJones, Karen, _d1960- _eeditor. _9439842
700	1		_aSchroeter, François, _eeditor. _91141604
907			_a.b26581358 _b06-09-21 _c18-04-19
942			_cB
945			_a149.7 MAN _g1 _iA536078B _j0 _lnmain _o- _p$105.70 _q- _r- _s- _t0 _u0 _v0 _w0 _x0 _y.i13635001 _z15-05-19
998			_a(2)b _a(2)n _b30-04-19 _cm _da _feng _genk _h4
999			_c1500189 _d1500189