000			04449cam a2200361 i 4500
005			20221102160035.0
008			130401s2013 enk b 001 0 eng d
011			_aBIB MATCHES WORLDCAT
020			_a019967339X
020			_a9780199673391
035			_a(ATU)b13627934
035			_a(OCoLC)834435454
040			_aBTCTA _beng _erda _cBTCTA _dUKMGB _dYDXCP _dNLE _dOCLCO _dUAB _dU3G _dBDX _dOCLCF _dDLC _dUMS _dUPM _dATU
050		4	_aBD215 _b.G53 2013
082	0	4	_a121 _223
100	1		_aGibbons, John _c(Associate professor of philosophy) _eauthor. _9832856
245	1	4	_aThe norm of belief / _cJohn Gibbons.
264		1	_aOxford : _bOxford University Press, _c2013.
264		4	_c©2013
300			_axv, 302 pages ; _c24 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_a1. The Puzzle -- 2. Subjective and Objective "Oughts" -- 3. Blaming the Question -- 4. The Derivation -- 5. Teleology -- 6. Guidance -- 7. Access -- 8. Knowledge versus Truth -- 9. Moore -- 10. The Moore Conditionals -- --
505	0	0	_g1. _tThe Puzzle -- _tSubjectivism -- _tObjectivism -- _tThe first-person point of view -- _tThe ambiguity theory -- _tThe last resort: nihilism -- _tSummary -- -- _g2. _tSubjective and Objective "Oughts" -- _tThe first proposal -- _tThe second proposal -- _tThe third proposal -- _tOne more try -- -- _g3. _tBlaming the Question -- _tThe regular "ought" -- _tThe given -- _tWide-scoping -- _tContextualism -- _tRadical contextualism -- _tIncommensurability -- -- _g4. _tThe Derivation -- _tTwo kinds of objectivists -- _tThe Bad Attempt -- _tWilliamson -- _tWedgwood -- -- _g5. _tTeleology -- _tThe upside -- _tThe limitations -- _tThe main difficulty -- _tVariations -- -- _g6. _tGuidance -- _tKnowledge only -- _tThe natural reaction -- _tTwo kinds of guidance -- _tWhat difference does a mind make? -- _tGetting a grip -- _tObjective reasons to act -- _tObjective reasons to believe -- -- _g7. _tAccess -- _tThe constraint -- _tThe regress -- _tTwo explanations of privilege -- _tWorldly requirements -- _tWorldly explanations -- _tExplaining privilege -- _tExternalism and the love of Reason -- _tThe options -- -- _g8. _tKnowledge versus Truth -- _tThe practical case -- _tCommitment -- _tDefeaters -- _tDefining undermining -- _tOther possibilities -- _tThe aim of belief -- _tThe lottery -- _tWhy knowledge? -- -- _g9. _tMoore -- _tBelief's own standards -- _tTaking a stand -- _tCommitment -- _tIncoherence without inconsistency -- _tThe first pass -- _tThe second pass -- _tBack to (0) -- _tWhat they have in common -- _tKnowledge -- _tJustification -- -- _g10. _tThe Moore Conditionals -- _tThe Moore Conditionals -- _tThe objectivist intuitions -- _tGeneral and particular -- _tThe umbrella -- _tInference from a false belief -- _tMoorean redundancy and triviality -- _tOne kind of triviality -- _tNoninferential justification -- _tIn between following and acting in accord -- _tFirst Order First -- _tConclusion.
520			_a"John Gibbons presents an original account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms. One task is to say where these standards come from. But the more basic task is to say what those standards are. In some sense, beliefs are supposed to be true. Perhaps they're supposed to constitute knowledge. And in some sense, they really ought to be reasonable. Which, if any of these is the fundamental norm of belief? The Norm of Belief argues against the teleological or instrumentalist conception of rationality that sees being reasonable as a means to our more objective aims, either knowledge or truth. And it tries to explain both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable. But the importance of being reasonable is not explained in terms of what it will get you, or what you think it will get you, or what it would get you if only things were different. The requirement to be reasonable comes from the very idea of what a genuine requirement is. That is where the built-in standards governing belief come from, and that is what they are."--Publisher's website.
650		0	_aBelief and doubt. _9314487
907			_a.b13627934 _b06-09-21 _c28-10-15
942			_cB
945			_a121 GIB _g1 _iA526424B _j0 _lnmain _o- _p$84.80 _q- _r- _s- _t0 _u3 _v0 _w0 _x0 _y.i13400447 _z29-10-15
998			_ab _an _b06-04-16 _cm _da _feng _genk _h4
999			_c1273104 _d1273104