000 02931cam a22004334i 4500
005 20221101183429.0
008 051010s2002 enk b 001 0 eng d
010 _a 2001025951
011 _aBIB MATCHES WORLDCAT
020 _a0521806054
020 _a9780521806053
020 _a0521000645
_qpb.
020 _a9780521000642
_qpb.
035 _a(ATU)b11045619
035 _a(DLC) 2001025951
035 _a(OCoLC)46883021
040 _aDLC
_beng
_erda
_dATU
042 _apcc
050 0 0 _aJC11
_b.B385 2002
082 0 0 _a320.1
_221
100 1 _aBarzel, Yoram,
_eauthor.
_91055355
245 1 2 _aA theory of the state :
_beconomic rights, legal rights, and the scope of the state /
_cYoram Barzel.
264 1 _aCambridge ;
_aNew York :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c2002.
300 _axiii, 289 pages ;
_c24 cm.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 277-281) and index.
505 0 0 _g1.
_tIntroduction --
_g1.
_tThe Emergence of Protection and Third-Party Enforcement.
_g2.
_tThe State and the Enforcement of Agreements.
_g3.
_tThird-Party Enforcement and the State.
_g4.
_tThe Choice among Enforcement Forms.
_g5.
_tAnonymous Exchange, Mixed Enforcement, and Vertical Integration.
_g6.
_tJurisdictional Issues.
_g7.
_tCollective Action and Collective Decisions.
_g8.
_tTying the Protector's Hands: The Agreement between Subjects and Protector --
_g2.
_tThe Emergence of Legal Institutions.
_g9.
_tLegal Rights.
_g10.
_tThe State's Enhancement of Market Trade.
_g11.
_tThe Size and Scope of the State --
_g3.
_tThe Character of the State.
_g11.
_tMerger and Local Autonomy.
_g13.
_tThe Distinction between "Legitimate" and "Criminal" States.
_g14.
_tPower, Violent Conflict, and Political Evolution.
_g15.
_tThe Time Path of Change under Dictatorships and under Rule-of-Law Regimes.
_g16.
_tRecapitulation and an Epilogue.
520 1 _a"This book models the emergence of the state and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals are expected to install rulers only after they have created mechanisms to control them. Among the offshoots of the organized protection are a legal system and decision-making procedures that include voting. The initial "state of nature," then, may gradually evolve into a rule-of-law state."--BOOK JACKET.
588 _aMachine converted from AACR2 source record.
650 0 _aState, The.
_9324466
830 0 _aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions.
_91033014
907 _a.b11045619
_b23-03-18
_c27-10-15
942 _cB
945 _a320.1 BAR
_g1
_iA418988B
_j0
_lcmain
_o-
_p$92.13
_q-
_r-
_s-
_t0
_u0
_v0
_w0
_x0
_y.i12311194
_z29-10-15
998 _a(2)b
_a(2)c
_b23-03-18
_cm
_da
_feng
_genk
_h2
999 _c1162151
_d1162151