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050 | 0 | 0 |
_aJC11 _b.B385 2002 |
082 | 0 | 0 |
_a320.1 _221 |
100 | 1 |
_aBarzel, Yoram, _eauthor. _91055355 |
|
245 | 1 | 2 |
_aA theory of the state : _beconomic rights, legal rights, and the scope of the state / _cYoram Barzel. |
264 | 1 |
_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2002. |
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300 |
_axiii, 289 pages ; _c24 cm. |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia |
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338 |
_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier |
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490 | 1 | _aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions | |
504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 277-281) and index. | ||
505 | 0 | 0 |
_g1. _tIntroduction -- _g1. _tThe Emergence of Protection and Third-Party Enforcement. _g2. _tThe State and the Enforcement of Agreements. _g3. _tThird-Party Enforcement and the State. _g4. _tThe Choice among Enforcement Forms. _g5. _tAnonymous Exchange, Mixed Enforcement, and Vertical Integration. _g6. _tJurisdictional Issues. _g7. _tCollective Action and Collective Decisions. _g8. _tTying the Protector's Hands: The Agreement between Subjects and Protector -- _g2. _tThe Emergence of Legal Institutions. _g9. _tLegal Rights. _g10. _tThe State's Enhancement of Market Trade. _g11. _tThe Size and Scope of the State -- _g3. _tThe Character of the State. _g11. _tMerger and Local Autonomy. _g13. _tThe Distinction between "Legitimate" and "Criminal" States. _g14. _tPower, Violent Conflict, and Political Evolution. _g15. _tThe Time Path of Change under Dictatorships and under Rule-of-Law Regimes. _g16. _tRecapitulation and an Epilogue. |
520 | 1 | _a"This book models the emergence of the state and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals are expected to install rulers only after they have created mechanisms to control them. Among the offshoots of the organized protection are a legal system and decision-making procedures that include voting. The initial "state of nature," then, may gradually evolve into a rule-of-law state."--BOOK JACKET. | |
588 | _aMachine converted from AACR2 source record. | ||
650 | 0 |
_aState, The. _9324466 |
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830 | 0 |
_aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions. _91033014 |
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