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010 _a 2004051675
011 _aBIB MATCHES WORLDCAT
020 _a0333682394
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020 _a9780333682395
_qcloth
035 _a(ATU)b10977843
035 _a(DLC) 2004051675
035 _a(OCoLC)55534849
040 _aDLC
_beng
_erda
_dATU
042 _apcc
050 0 0 _aHB95
_b.S84 2005
082 0 0 _a330.1
_222
100 1 _aSugden, Robert,
_eauthor.
_91052778
245 1 4 _aThe economics of rights, co-operation, and welfare /
_cRobert Sugden.
250 _aSecond edition.
264 1 _aNew York :
_bPalgrave Macmillan,
_c[2005]
264 4 _c©2005
300 _axiv, 243 pages :
_billustrations ;
_c22 cm
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 0 _g1.
_tSpontaneous order --
_g2.
_tGames --
_g3.
_tCoordination --
_g4.
_tProperty --
_g5.
_tPossession --
_g6.
_tReciprocity --
_g7.
_tFree riders --
_g8.
_tNatural law --
_g9.
_tRights, co-operation and welfare.
520 1 _a"In The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, Robert Sugden sets out to answer a question that lies at the heart of economics and politics: how can individuals coordinate their behaviour in the absence of central law-enforcing agencies? Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, Sugden shows how self-enforcing conventions of property and reciprocity can evolve spontaneously out of the interactions of self-interested individuals. He goes on to argue that such conventions tend to become norms, even if they arbitrarily favour some people relative to others, and even if they do not maximize social welfare."--BOOK JACKET.
588 _aMachine converted from AACR2 source record.
650 0 _aFree enterprise
_9345435
650 0 _aLiberty
_9320019
650 0 _aProperty
_9322839
650 0 _aWelfare economics
_9325806
650 0 _aSocial choice
_9324135
856 4 2 _3Contributor biographical information
_uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/bios/hol051/2004051675.html
907 _a.b10977843
_b10-06-19
_c27-10-15
942 _cB
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