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010 _a 2002075387
011 _aBIB MATCHES WORLDCAT
020 _a0262134233
_qalk. paper
020 _a9780262134231
_qalk. paper
035 _a(ATU)b10964848
035 _a(DLC) 2002075387
035 _a(OCoLC)50028447
040 _aDLC
_beng
_erda
_dATU
042 _apcc
050 0 0 _aHB846
_b.M68 2003
082 0 0 _a330.126
_221
100 1 _aMoulin, Hervé,
_eauthor.
_9278436
245 1 0 _aFair division and collective welfare /
_cHervé Moulin.
264 1 _aCambridge, Mass. :
_bMIT Press,
_c[2003]
264 4 _c©2003
300 _a289 pages ;
_c24 cm
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 277-280) and index.
505 0 0 _g1.
_tMicroeconomic Foundations --
_g1.1.
_tFairness: Equal and Unequal Treatment --
_g1.2.
_tCollective Welfare: Cardinal --
_g1.3.
_tCollective Welfare: Ordinal --
_g1.4.
_tExternalities and Fair Division --
_g1.5.
_tPrivate versus Public Contracts --
_g1.6.
_tOrganization and Overview of the Book --
_g2.
_tFair Distribution --
_g2.1.
_tFour Principles of Distributive Justice --
_g2.2.
_tA Simple Model of Fair Distribution --
_g2.3.
_tContested Garment Method --
_g2.4.
_tEqual Sacrifice in Taxation --
_g2.5.
_tSum-Fitness and Equality --
_g3.
_tCardinal Welfarism --
_g3.1.
_tWelfarism --
_g3.2.
_tAdditive Collective Utility Functions --
_g3.3.
_tEgalitarianism and the Leximin Social Welfare Ordering --
_g3.4.
_tComparing Classical Utilitarianism, Nash, and Leximin --
_g3.5.
_tFailures of Monotonicity --
_g3.6.
_tBargaining Compromise --
_g4.
_tVoting and Social Choice --
_g4.1.
_tOrdinal Welfarism --
_g4.2.
_tCondorcet versus Borda --
_g4.3.
_tVoting over Resource Allocation --
_g4.4.
_tSingle-Peaked Preferences --
_g4.5.
_tIntermediate Preferences --
_g4.6.
_tPreference Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem.
520 1 _a"The book begins with the epistemological status of the axiomatic approach and the four classic principles of distributive justice: compensation, reward, exogenous rights, and fitness. It then presents the simple ideas of equal gains, equal losses, and proportional gains and losses. The book discusses there cardinal interpretations of collective welfare: Bentham's "utilitarian" proposal to maximize the sum of individual utilities, the Nash product, and the egalitarian leximin ordering. It also discusses the two main ordinal definitions of collective welfare: the majority relation and the Borda scoring method." "The Shapley value is the single most important contribution of game theory to distributive justice. A formula to divide jointly produced costs or benefits fairly, it is especially useful when the pattern of externalities renders useless the simple ideas of equality and proportionality. The book ends with two versatile methods for dividing commodities efficiently and fairly when only ordinal preferences matter: competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and egalitarian equivalence. The book contains a wealth of empirical examples and exercises."--BOOK JACKET.
588 _aMachine converted from AACR2 source record.
650 0 _aWelfare economics
_9325806
650 0 _aEquality
_xEconomic aspects
_9797704
650 0 _aIncome distribution
_9319168
650 0 _aWealth
_xMoral and ethical aspects
_9325779
650 0 _aDistributive justice
_9316761
907 _a.b10964848
_b03-10-17
_c27-10-15
998 _a(2)b
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_b06-04-16
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