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005 | 20211105152853.0 | ||
008 | 050503s2003 mau b 001 0 eng d | ||
010 | _a 2002075387 | ||
011 | _aBIB MATCHES WORLDCAT | ||
020 |
_a0262134233 _qalk. paper |
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020 |
_a9780262134231 _qalk. paper |
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035 | _a(ATU)b10964848 | ||
035 | _a(DLC) 2002075387 | ||
035 | _a(OCoLC)50028447 | ||
040 |
_aDLC _beng _erda _dATU |
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042 | _apcc | ||
050 | 0 | 0 |
_aHB846 _b.M68 2003 |
082 | 0 | 0 |
_a330.126 _221 |
100 | 1 |
_aMoulin, Hervé, _eauthor. _9278436 |
|
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aFair division and collective welfare / _cHervé Moulin. |
264 | 1 |
_aCambridge, Mass. : _bMIT Press, _c[2003] |
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264 | 4 | _c©2003 | |
300 |
_a289 pages ; _c24 cm |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia |
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338 |
_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier |
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504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 277-280) and index. | ||
505 | 0 | 0 |
_g1. _tMicroeconomic Foundations -- _g1.1. _tFairness: Equal and Unequal Treatment -- _g1.2. _tCollective Welfare: Cardinal -- _g1.3. _tCollective Welfare: Ordinal -- _g1.4. _tExternalities and Fair Division -- _g1.5. _tPrivate versus Public Contracts -- _g1.6. _tOrganization and Overview of the Book -- _g2. _tFair Distribution -- _g2.1. _tFour Principles of Distributive Justice -- _g2.2. _tA Simple Model of Fair Distribution -- _g2.3. _tContested Garment Method -- _g2.4. _tEqual Sacrifice in Taxation -- _g2.5. _tSum-Fitness and Equality -- _g3. _tCardinal Welfarism -- _g3.1. _tWelfarism -- _g3.2. _tAdditive Collective Utility Functions -- _g3.3. _tEgalitarianism and the Leximin Social Welfare Ordering -- _g3.4. _tComparing Classical Utilitarianism, Nash, and Leximin -- _g3.5. _tFailures of Monotonicity -- _g3.6. _tBargaining Compromise -- _g4. _tVoting and Social Choice -- _g4.1. _tOrdinal Welfarism -- _g4.2. _tCondorcet versus Borda -- _g4.3. _tVoting over Resource Allocation -- _g4.4. _tSingle-Peaked Preferences -- _g4.5. _tIntermediate Preferences -- _g4.6. _tPreference Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem. |
520 | 1 | _a"The book begins with the epistemological status of the axiomatic approach and the four classic principles of distributive justice: compensation, reward, exogenous rights, and fitness. It then presents the simple ideas of equal gains, equal losses, and proportional gains and losses. The book discusses there cardinal interpretations of collective welfare: Bentham's "utilitarian" proposal to maximize the sum of individual utilities, the Nash product, and the egalitarian leximin ordering. It also discusses the two main ordinal definitions of collective welfare: the majority relation and the Borda scoring method." "The Shapley value is the single most important contribution of game theory to distributive justice. A formula to divide jointly produced costs or benefits fairly, it is especially useful when the pattern of externalities renders useless the simple ideas of equality and proportionality. The book ends with two versatile methods for dividing commodities efficiently and fairly when only ordinal preferences matter: competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and egalitarian equivalence. The book contains a wealth of empirical examples and exercises."--BOOK JACKET. | |
588 | _aMachine converted from AACR2 source record. | ||
650 | 0 |
_aWelfare economics _9325806 |
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650 | 0 |
_aEquality _xEconomic aspects _9797704 |
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650 | 0 |
_aIncome distribution _9319168 |
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650 | 0 |
_aWealth _xMoral and ethical aspects _9325779 |
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650 | 0 |
_aDistributive justice _9316761 |
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907 |
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