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008			020826s2003 nyuab b 001 0 eng d
010			_a 2002034642
011			_aBIB MATCHES WORLDCAT
020			_a0691090394 _qalk. paper
020			_a9780691090399 _qalk. paper
035			_a(OCoLC)50518630
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dMUQ _dBAKER _dNLGGC _dYDXCP _dOCLCQ _dBTCTA _dUBA _dOCLCG _dIG# _dHEBIS _dDEBBG _dAD# _dOCL _dYUS _dATU
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aHB144 _b.C364 2003
082	0	0	_a330.015193 _221
100	1		_aCamerer, Colin, _d1959- _eauthor. _9411253
245	1	0	_aBehavioral game theory : _bexperiments in strategic interaction / _cColin F. Camerer.
246	3		_aBehavioural game theory
246	3		_aBehavioural game theory : _bExperiments in strategic interaction
264		1	_aNew York, N.Y. : _bRussell Sage Foundation ; _aPrinceton, N.J. : _bPrinceton University Press, _c[2003]
264		4	_c©2003
300			_axv, 550 pages : _billustrations, 1 map ; _c24 cm.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aThe roundtable series in behavioral economics
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 497-533) and index.
505	0	0	_g1. _tIntroduction -- _g1.1. _tWhat is Game Theory Good For? -- _g1.2. _tThree Examples -- _g1.3. _tExperimental Regularity and Behavioral Game Theory -- _gApp. A1.1. _tBasic Game Theory -- _gApp. A1.2. _tExperimental Design -- _g2. _tDictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games -- _g2.1. _tUltimatum and Dictator Games: Basic Results -- _g2.2. _tMethodological Variables -- _g2.3. _tDemographic Variables -- _g2.4. _tCulture -- _g2.5. _tDescriptive Variables: Labeling and Context -- _g2.6. _tStructural Variables -- _g2.7. _tTrust Games -- _g2.8. _tTheory -- _g3. _tMixed-Strategy Equilibrium -- _g3.1. _tEarly Studies -- _g3.2. _tModern Studies -- _g3.3. _tSubjective Randomization and Mixed Strategies -- _g3.4. _tExplicit Randomization -- _g3.5. _tPatent Race and Location Games with Mixed Equilibria -- _g3.6. _tTwo Field Studies -- _g4. _tBargaining -- _g4.1. _tUnstructured Bargaining -- _g4.2. _tStructured Bargaining -- _g4.3. _tBargaining under Incomplete Information -- _g5. _tDominance-Solvable Games -- _g5.1. _tSimple Dominance-Solvable Games -- _g5.2. _tBeauty Contest Games -- _g5.3. _tGames in Which Iterated Reasoning Decreases Payoffs -- _g5.4. _tWhen More Iteration is Better: The "Dirty Faces" Game -- _g5.5. _tThe "Groucho Marx" Theorem in Zero-Sum Betting -- _g5.6. _tStructural Models of Decision Rules and Levels of Reasoning -- _g5.7. _tTheories -- _gApp. _tRaw Choices in Email Game and Additional Data -- _g6. _tLearning -- _g6.1. _tTheories of Learning -- _g6.2. _tReinforcement Learning -- _g6.3. _tBelief Learning -- _g6.4. _tImitation Learning -- _g6.5. _tComparative Studies -- _g6.6. _tExperience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) Learning -- _g6.7. _tRule Learning -- _g6.8. _tEconometric Studies of Estimation Properties -- _g7. _tCoordination -- _g7.1. _tMatching Games -- _g7.2. _tAsymmetric Players: Battle of the Sexes -- _g7.3. _tMarket Entry Games -- _g7.4. _tPayoff-Asymmetric Order-Statistic Games -- _g7.5. _tSelecting Selection Principles -- _g7.6. _tApplications: Path-Dependence, Market Adoption, and Corporate Culture -- _gApp. _tPsycholinguistics -- _g8. _tSignaling and Reputation -- _g8.1. _tSimple Signaling Games and Adaptive Dynamics -- _g8.2. _tSpecialized Signaling Games -- _g8.3. _tReputation Formation -- _g9. _tConclusion: What Do We Know, and Where Do We Go? -- _g9.1. _tSummary of Results -- _g9.2. _tTop Ten Open Research Questions -- _gApp. _tDesign Details.
520			_aGame theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
588			_aMachine converted from AACR2 source record.
650		0	_aGame theory. _9318254
650		0	_aStatistical decision _9324475
650		0	_aDecision making. _9349814
830		0	_aRoundtable series in behavioral economics. _91045083
907			_a.b10769183 _b23-03-18 _c27-10-15
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