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008			010806s2002 nyua b 001 0 eng d
010			_a 2001044563
011			_aBIB MATCHES WORLDCAT
020			_a0393976483
020			_a9780393976489
035			_a(DLC) 2001044563
035			_a(OCoLC)47797333
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _dATU
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aHB144. _bW37 2002
082	0		_a330.019
100	1		_aWatson, Joel, _eauthor. _91032987
245	1	0	_aStrategy : _ban introduction to game theory / _cJoel Watson.
264		1	_aNew York : _bW.W. Norton, _c[2002]
264		4	_c©2002
300			_axv, 334 pages : _billustrations ; _c24 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0	0	_tPreface -- _g1. _tIntroduction -- _tNoncooperative Game Theory -- _tContract and Cooperative Game Theory -- _tThe Meaning of "Game" -- _gPart I. _tRepresenting Games -- _g2. _tThe Extensive Form -- _tOther Examples and Conventions -- _tExercises -- _g3. _tStrategies -- _tExercises -- _g4. _tThe Normal Form -- _tClassic Normal-Form Games -- _tInterpretation of the Normal Form -- _tExercises -- _g5. _tBeliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Utility -- _tExercises -- _gPart II. _tAnalyzing Behavior in Static Settings -- _g6. _tDominance and Best Response -- _tDominance -- _tThe First Strategic Tension and the Prisoners' Dilemma -- _tThe Concept of Efficiency -- _tBest Response -- _tDominance and Best Response Compared -- _tExercises -- _g7. _tRationalizability and Iterated Dominance -- _tThe Second Strategic Tension -- _tExercises -- _g8. _tLocation and Partnership -- _tA Location Game -- _tA Partnership Game: Strategic Complementarities -- _tExercises -- _g9. _tCongruous Strategies and Nash Equilibrium -- _tCongruous Sets -- _tNash Equilibrium -- _tEquilibrium of the Partnership Game -- _tCoordination and Social Welfare -- _tThe Third Strategic Tension -- _tAside: Behavioral Game Theory -- _tExercises -- _g10. _tOligopoly, Tariffs, and Crime and Punishment -- _tCournot Duopoly Model -- _tBertrand Duopoly Model -- _tTariff Setting by Two Countries -- _tA Model of Crime and Police -- _tExercises -- _g11. _tMixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- _tExercises -- _g12. _tStrictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies -- _tExercises -- _g13. _tContract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings -- _tComplete Contracting in Discretionary Environments -- _tContracting with Court-Imposed Breach Remedies -- _tExercises -- _gPart III. _tAnalyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings -- _g14. _tDetails of the Extensive Form -- _tExercises -- _g15. _tBackward Induction and Subgame Perfection -- _tSequential Rationality and Backward Induction -- _tSubgame Perfection -- _tExercises -- _g16. _tTopics in Industrial Organization -- _tAdvertising and Competition -- _tA Model of Limit Capacity -- _tDynamic Monopoly -- _tPrice Guarantees as a Commitment to High Prices -- _tExercises -- _g17. _tParlor Games -- _tExercises -- _g18. _tBargaining Problems -- _tBargaining: Value Creation and Division -- _tAn Abstract Representation of Bargaining Problems -- _tAn Example -- _tThe Standard Bargaining Solution -- _tExercises -- _g19. _tAnalysis of Simple Bargaining Games -- _tUltimatum Games: Power to the Proposer -- _tTwo-Period, Alternating-Offer Games: Power to the Patient -- _tInfinite-Period, Alternating-Offer Game -- _tExercises -- _g20. _tGames with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium -- _tJoint Decisions -- _tNegotiation Equilibrium -- _tExample: Contracting for High-Powered Incentives -- _tExercises -- _g21. _tInvestment, Hold Up, and Ownership -- _tHold Up Example -- _tAsset Ownership -- _tExercises -- _g22. _tRepeated Games and Reputation -- _tA Two-Period Repeated Game -- _tAn Infinitely Repeated Game -- _tThe Equilibrium Payoff Set with Low Discounting -- _tExercises -- _g23. _tCollusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill -- _tDynamic Oligopoly and Collusion -- _tEnforcing International Trade Agreements -- _tGoodwill and Trading a Reputation -- _tExercises -- _gPart IV. _tInformation -- _g24. _tRandom Events and Incomplete Information -- _tExercises -- _g25. _tRisk and Incentives in Contracting -- _tRisk Aversion -- _tA Principal-Agent Game -- _tExercises -- _g26. _tBayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability -- _tExercises -- _g27. _tTrade with Incomplete Information -- _tMarkets and Lemons -- _tAuctions -- _tExercises -- _g28. _tPerfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- _tConditional Beliefs about Types -- _tSequential Rationality -- _tConsistency of Beliefs -- _tEquilibrium Definition -- _tExercises -- _g29. _tJob-Market Signaling and Reputation -- _tJobs and School -- _tReputation and Incomplete Information -- _tExercises -- _tAppendices -- _gA. _tReview of Mathematics -- _tSets -- _tFunctions and Calculus -- _tProbability -- _gB. _tThe Mathematics of Rationalizability -- _tDominance, Best Response, and Correlated Conjectures -- _tRationalizability Construction -- _tExercises -- _tIndex.
588			_aMachine converted from AACR2 source record.
650		0	_aGame theory. _9318254
650		0	_aEconomics _xPsychological aspects _9316969
650		0	_aStrategic planning. _9345424
907			_a.b10447118 _b11-07-17 _c27-10-15
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