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008 | 980629s1997 enk b 001 0 eng d | ||
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050 | 0 | 0 |
_aJF541 _b.T76 1997 |
082 | 0 | 0 |
_a328.3 _220 |
100 | 1 |
_aTsebelis, George, _eauthor. _91033032 |
|
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aBicameralism / _cGeorge Tsebelis, Jeannette Money. |
264 | 1 |
_aCambridge, U.K. ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c1997. |
|
300 |
_axiv, 250 pages ; _c24 cm. |
||
336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
||
337 |
_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia |
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338 |
_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier |
||
490 | 1 | _aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions | |
504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 233-242) and index. | ||
505 | 0 | 0 |
_gPart I. _tHistory and Geography of Bicameral Diversity: -- _g1. _tBicameralism in historical perspective -- _g2. _tThe institutions of bicameralism -- _gPart II. _tModels of Bicameral Institutions: -- _g3. _tThe core and the uncovered set of bicameral institutions -- _g4. _tA Model of intercameral bargaining -- _g5. _tA model of conference committees and their proposals -- _gPart III. _tEmpirical Studies of Bicameralism and Implications: -- _g6. _tThe outcomes of intercameral bargaining -- _g7. _tThe process of intercameral bargaining -- _g8. _tConference committees -- _g9. _tImplications -- _tConclusions. |
520 | _a"This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments."--Publisher description. | ||
588 | _aMachine converted from AACR2 source record. | ||
650 | 0 |
_aLegislative bodies _9319987 |
|
700 | 1 |
_aMoney, Jeannette, _eauthor. _91033035 |
|
830 | 0 |
_aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions. _91033014 |
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_a.b10061927 _b26-03-18 _c27-10-15 |
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