000 03082cam a2200433 i 4500
005 20221101183045.0
008 980629s1997 enk b 001 0 eng d
010 _a 96043839
011 _aBIB MATCHES WORLDCAT
020 _a0521580374
020 _a9780521580373
020 _a052158972X
_qpbk.
020 _a9780521589727
_qpbk.
035 _a(ATU)b10061927
035 _a(DLC) 96043839
035 _a(OCoLC)35627636
040 _aDLC
_beng
_erda
_dATU
050 0 0 _aJF541
_b.T76 1997
082 0 0 _a328.3
_220
100 1 _aTsebelis, George,
_eauthor.
_91033032
245 1 0 _aBicameralism /
_cGeorge Tsebelis, Jeannette Money.
264 1 _aCambridge, U.K. ;
_aNew York :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c1997.
300 _axiv, 250 pages ;
_c24 cm.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 233-242) and index.
505 0 0 _gPart I.
_tHistory and Geography of Bicameral Diversity: --
_g1.
_tBicameralism in historical perspective --
_g2.
_tThe institutions of bicameralism --
_gPart II.
_tModels of Bicameral Institutions: --
_g3.
_tThe core and the uncovered set of bicameral institutions --
_g4.
_tA Model of intercameral bargaining --
_g5.
_tA model of conference committees and their proposals --
_gPart III.
_tEmpirical Studies of Bicameralism and Implications: --
_g6.
_tThe outcomes of intercameral bargaining --
_g7.
_tThe process of intercameral bargaining --
_g8.
_tConference committees --
_g9.
_tImplications --
_tConclusions.
520 _a"This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments."--Publisher description.
588 _aMachine converted from AACR2 source record.
650 0 _aLegislative bodies
_9319987
700 1 _aMoney, Jeannette,
_eauthor.
_91033035
830 0 _aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions.
_91033014
907 _a.b10061927
_b26-03-18
_c27-10-15
942 _cB
945 _a328.3 TSE
_g1
_iA155490B
_j0
_lcmain
_o-
_p$31.26
_q-
_r-
_s-
_t0
_u1
_v0
_w0
_x0
_y.i10173729
_z28-10-15
998 _a(3)b
_a(3)c
_b06-04-16
_cm
_da
_feng
_genk
_h0
999 _c1103120
_d1103120