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010 | _a 2002019300 | ||
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035 | _a(ATU)b10040845 | ||
035 | _a(DLC) 2002019300 | ||
035 | _a(OCoLC)48958222 | ||
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_aDLC _beng _erda _dATU |
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_aK840 _b.E28 2002 |
082 | 0 | _a330.1 | |
245 | 0 | 4 |
_aThe economics of contracts : _btheories and applications / _cedited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant. |
264 | 1 |
_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2002. |
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300 |
_axvi, 584 pages : _billustrations ; _c24 cm |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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337 |
_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia |
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338 |
_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier |
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500 | _aIncludes revised and translated versions of chapters which appeared in a special issue of Revue d'économie industrielle (2002, 92). | ||
504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 531-569) and index. | ||
505 | 0 | 0 |
_gPt. I. _tIntroduction. _g1. _tThe economics of contracts and the renewal of economics / _rEric Brousseau and Jean-Michael Glachant -- _gApp. _tCanonical models of theories of contract / _rM'hand Fares -- _gPt. II. _tContracts, organizations, and institutions. _g2. _tThe New Institutional Economics / _rRonald Coase. _g3. _tContract and economic organization / _rOliver E. Williamson. _g4. _tThe role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships / _rBenjamin Klein. _g5. _tEntrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts / _rEirik G. Furubotn -- _gPt. III. _tLaw and economics. _g6. _tThe contract as economic trade / _rJacques Ghestin. _g7. _tContract theory and theories of contract regulation / _rAlan Schwartz. _g8. _tEconomic reasoning and the framing of contract law: sale of an asset of uncertain value / _rVictor P. Goldberg. _g9. _tA transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights / _rGary D. Libecap -- _gPt. IV. _tTheoretical developments: where do we stand? _g10. _tTransaction costs and incentive theory / _rEric Malin and David Martimort. _g11. _tNorms and the theory of the firm / _rOliver Hart. _g12. _tAllocating decision rights under liquidity constraints / _rPhilippe Aghion and Patrick Rey. _g13. _tComplexity and contract / _rW. Bentley Macleod. _g14. _tAuthority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts / _rOlivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser. _g15. _tPositive agency theory: place and contributions / _rGerard Charreaux -- _gPt. V. _tTesting contract theories. _g16. _tEconometrics of contracts: an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting / _rScott E. Masten and Stephane Saussier. _g17. _tExperiments on moral hazard and incentives: reciprocity and surplus-sharing / _rClaudia Keser and Marc Willinger -- _gPt. VI. _tApplied issues: contributions to industrial organization. _g18. _tResidual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts: substitutes or complements? / _rFrancine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud. _g19. _tThe quasi-judicial role of large retailers: an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers / _rBenito Arrunada. _g20. _tInterconnection agreements in telecommunications networks: from strategic behaviors to property rights / _rGodefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Penard. _g21. _tLicensing in the chemical industry / _rAshish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri -- _gPt. VII. _tPolicy issues: anti-trust and regulation of public utilities. _g22. _tInter-company agreements and EC competition law / _rMichael Glais. _g23. _tIncentive contracts in utility regulation / _rMatthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price. _g24. _tContractual choice and performance: the case of water supply in France / _rClaude Menard and Stephane Saussier. _g25. _tInstitutional or structural: lessons from international electricity sector reforms / _rGuy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller. _g26. _tElectricity sector restructuring and competition: a transaction-cost perspective / _rPaul L. Joskow. |
520 | _a"A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this book provides an overview of the past and recent developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners."--Publisher description. | ||
588 | _aMachine converted from AACR2 source record. | ||
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_aContracts _xEconomic aspects _9371319 |
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_aBrousseau, Eric, _eeditor. _91031546 |
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_aGlachant, Jean-Michel, _eeditor. _91031548 |
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_3Sample text _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam033/2002019300.html |
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