TY  - BOOK
AU  - Pigden,Charles R.
TI  - Hume on Is and Ought
SN  - 0230205208
AV  - B1499.E8 H838 2010
U1  - 170.92 22
PY  - 2010///
CY  - Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York
PB  - Palgrave Macmillan
KW  - Hume, David,
KW  - Ethics
N1  - Includes bibliographical references and index; Introduction / Charles R. Pigden -- The autonomy of ethics / A.N. Prior -- Professor Prior on the autonomy of ethics / J.M. Shorter -- Hume's own 'ought' conclusions / Annette C. Baier -- Much obliged / Wade L. Robison -- A letter from a gentleman in Dunedin to a lady in the country / A Gentleman -- Hume's master argument / Adrian Heathcote -- Heathcore's Hume / Alan Musgrave -- On Heathcore against Hume's law / Norva Y.S. Lo -- Comments on 'Hume's master argument' / Charles R. Pigen -- Comments on 'Hume's master argument' / Gerhard Schurz -- Reply to my bountiful critics / Adrian Heathcote -- In defence of Hume's law / Gillian Russell -- The significance of Hume's law / Håkan Salwén -- Snare's puzzle/Hume's purpose: non-cognitivism and what Hume was really up to with no-ought-from-is / Charles R. Pigden -- Comments on Salwén and Pigden / Norva Y. S. Lo -- Reply to Lo / Charles R. Pigden -- Non-trivial versions of Hume's is-ought thesis / Gerhard Schurz -- On the triviality of Hume's law: a reply to Gerhard Schurz / Charles R. Pigden -- Reply to Pigden / Gerhard Schurz -- Barriers to implication / Greg Restall and Gillian Russell -- Comments on 'Barriers to implication' / Peter B.M. Vranas -- Comments on Restall, Russell and Vranas / Gerhard Schruz -- Supervenience and the autonomy of ethics: yet another way in which relevant logic is superior to classical logic / Edwin D. Mares -- Moral conclusions from non-moral premises / Stephen Maitzen -- Comments on 'Moral conclusions from non-moral premises' / Gerhard Schurz -- Substance, content, taxonomy and consequence: a comment on Stephen Maitzen / Charles R. Pigden -- Reply to Pigden and Schurz / Stephen Maitzen
N2  - "This collection of essays showcases recent work on Hume and the Is/Ought question. There are four distinct attempts to redefine and prove Hume's no-ought-from-is thesis in such a way as to evade the famous counterexamples of A.N. Prior. The rival approaches are explained and discussed together with their implications for meta-ethical theory"--Provided by publisher
ER  -