The many moral rationalisms / edited by Karen Jones and François Schroeter.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Introduction / François Schroeter, Karen Jones, Laura Schroeter -- Humanity as an end in itself / Julia Markovits -- Three kinds of moral rationalism / Michael Smith -- Constitutivism about reasons : autonomy and understanding / Karl Schafer -- Constructivism and the normativity of practical reason / Nicholas Southwood -- Moral requirements and permissions, and the requirements and permissions of reason / Sarah Buss -- Reasons and justifiability / Laura Schroeter, François Schroeter -- Rationalist metaphysics, semantics, and metasemantics / Mark van Roojen -- Naturalistic moral realism, rationalism, and non-fundamental epistemology / Tristram McPherson -- The motivating power of the a priori obvious / RamNeta -- Stupid Goodness / Garrett Cullity -- What does it take to act for moral reasons? / Alison Hills -- Towards a trajectory-dependent model of (human) rational agency / Karen Jones -- the limits of emotion in moral judgment / Joshua May.

"Moral rationalism takes human reason and human rationality to be the key elements in an explanation of the nature of morality, moral judgment, and moral knowledge. This volume explores the resources of this rich philosophical tradition. Thirteen original essays, framed by the editors' introduction, critically examine the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason, (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. The five essays in Part I ('Normativity') offer contemporary defences or reconstructions of Kant's attempt to ground the normative thesis, that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action, in the nature of practical reason and practical rationality. The four essays in Part II ('Epistemology & Meaning') consider the viability of claims to a priori moral knowledge. The authors of all four essays are sympathetic to a realist moral metaphysics, and thus forgo the straightforward constructivist road to apriority. The four essays in Part III ('Psychology') each grapple with the implications for rationalism of the role of emotions and unconscious processes in moral judgement and action. Together the essays demonstrate that moral rationalism identifies not a single philosophical position but rather a family of philosophical positions, which resemble traditional rationalism, as exemplified by Kant, to varying degrees."-- Provided by publisher.