The handbook of market design / edited by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth and Zvika Neeman.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

General principles. What have we learned from market design? / Alvin E. Roth ; Not up to standard : stress testing market designs for misbehavior / Gary E. Bolton ; Using and abusing auction theory / Paul Klemperer -- Cases : matching markets. Market design for kidney exchange / Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver ; School choice / Atila Abdulkadiroğlu ; Improving efficiency in school choice / Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin ; Can the job market for economists be improved? / Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay [and seven others] ; Designing markets for ideas / Joshua S. Glans and Scott Stern ; Redesigning microcredit / Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström -- Cases : auctions. The product-mix auction : a new auction design for differentiated goods / Paul Klemperer ; Optimal incentives in core-selecting auctions / Robert Day and Paul Milgrom ; Auctioning rough diamonds : a competitive sales process for BHP Billiton's Ekati diamonds / Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson -- Cases : e-commerce. Ending rules in Internet auctions : design and behavior / Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth ; Designing markets for mixed use of humans and automated agents / Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan ; The design of online advertising markets / Benjamin Edelman ; Very-large-scale generalized combinatorial multi-attribute auctions : lessons from conducting $60 billion of sourcing / Tuomas Sandholm ; Designing automated markets for communication bandwidth / Nir Vulkan and Chris Preist -- Cases : law design. A mechanism design approach to legal problems / Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman ; Legislation with endogenous preferences / Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley -- Experiments. Common-value auctions with liquidity needs : an experimental test of a troubled-assets reverse auction / Lawrence M. Ausubel [and five others] ; Information disclosure in auctions : an experiment / Martin Dufwenberg and Uri Gneezy ; Experiments with buyer-determined procurement auctions / Elena Katok ; The inefficiency of splitting the bill / Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, and Hadas Yafe -- Competing designs. Competing mechanisms / Michael Peters ; Three case studies of competing designs in financial markets / Nir Vulkan and Zvika Neeman.

Annotation Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessonslearned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets. In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominenteconomists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run. There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades. In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to oneanother, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors. It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.

Machine converted from AACR2 source record.