Rescuing justice and equality / G.A. Cohen.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 413-421) and index.

Preface -- Introduction -- The Big Issue -- Rescuing Equality and Justice -- Some Methodological Disagreements -- Justice and Fairness -- The Two Standpoints -- The Greatness of John Rawls -- An Outline of the Book -- Part One. Rescuing Equality from -- 1. The Incentives Argument -- I. The Incentives Argument, The Interpersonal Test, and Community -- Incentives, the Difference Principle, and Equality -- Nigel Lawson's Tax Cut -- On Uttering Arguments in Variable Interpersonal Settings -- The Kidnapper's Argument -- Community, and the Interpersonal Test -- Does the Incentive Argument Pass the Interpersonal Test? -- II. Testing the Incentive Argument -- What Makes the Minor Premiss of the Incentive Argument True? -- Why the Incentive Argument Fails the Interpersonal Test -- The Incentive Argument and Bad Faith -- Should the Poor Reject the Incentive Argument? -- First Persons and Third Persons -- III. Incentives and the Difference Principle -- Strict and Lax Readings of the Difference Principle -- Why Just People Must Practise the Strict Difference Principle -- The Difference Principle and 'daily Life' -- Dignity, Fraternity, and The Difference Principle -- The Difference Principle and 'Mutual Indifference' -- The Difference Principle and the Unjust Society -- 2. The Pareto Argument for Inequality -- Introduction -- The Argument Expounded -- TheArgument Challenged -- The Argument Rejected -- Lab our. Burden in the Metric of Equality -- Inconsistent Metrics -- Raising the Baseline -- Impartiality and Mutual Advantage -- Inequality: A Necessary Evil? -- Conclusion -- 3. The Basic Structure Objection -- Incentives and the Difference Principle: A Review of the Argument -- The 'Basic Structure' Objection -- The 'Basic Structure' Objection: A Preliminary Reply -- The 'Basic Structure' Objection: A More Fundamental Reply -- Who is to Blame? -- Coercive and Non-Coercive Social Structures -- Appendix I. More on Coercion and the Basic Structure -- Appendix II. The Basic Structure is a Structure -- 4. The Difference Principle -- Introduction -- Reconsidering the Difference Principle -- The Moral Arbitrariness Case for the Difference Principle Contradicts its Content -- A Recent Argument for the Difference Principle -- A Contractarian Argument for the Difference Principle -- What is the Moral Arbitrariness of Talent Differences Supposed to Show? -- Chamberlain and Pareto -- Human Nature and Constructivism -- 5. The Freedom Objection -- Introduction -- Equality, Pareto, and Freedom of Choice of Occupatio Freedom in Work -- The Unequal-Income Inference -- Blood, Kidneys, and Sex -- 6. The Facts -- A Statement of my Thesis -- Facts, and Some Meta-Ethical Questions -- What Most Philosophers Think about Facts and Principles -- My Thesis: Ultimate Principles are Fact-Insensitive -- And the Clarity of Mind Requirement -- An Illustration of the Thesis -- More Illustration of the Thesis -- The Argument for the Thesis -- I. A Defence of the First Premiss of the Argument -- II. A Defence of the Second Premiss of the Argument -- III. A Defence of the Third Premiss of the Argument -- Still Further Illustration and Defence of the Thesis -- The Clarity of Mind Requirement -- The Merely Logical Priority of Fact-Insensitive Principles -- The Conditional Character of the Thesis -- On 'Is' and 'Ought' -- On 'Ought' and 'Can' -- Possible Misunderstandings of the Thesis -- The Thesis is not a Causal Thesis -- The Thesis is not a Psychological Thesis -- The Thesis is Neutral with Respect to Central Meta-Ethical Disputes -- Some Bad Rawlsian Arguments that Reject My Thesis -- Utilitarianism, and the Difference Between Fundamental Principles and Rules of Regulation -- The Interest of My Thesis -- Appendix: God -- Part Two. Rescuin Overview -- Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism -- Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism: Matters Arising -- Is Justice the First Virtue of Social Institutions? -- Two Illustrations: Social Insurance, Property Taxation -- Justice and the Pareto Principle -- Justice, and Constraints, Notably Publicity, on Choice of Optimal Rules at Regulation -- Justice and Stability -- The 'Circumstances of Justice' -- Conclusion -- Appendix: Is the Original Position Justification of Principles Contractarian? -- 8. The Publicity Argument -- Andrew Williams on Publicity and the Egalitarian Ethos -- An Anatomy of Williams's Argument -- Racism, Justice, and Assurance -- Does Assurance Williams-type Determinacy? -- Does Justice Require Precision? -- Egalitarian Ethi at Home, in the Market, and in the State -- Publicity as a Desideratum of Justice -- Justice and Occupational Choice -- Conclusion -- General Appendix: Replies to critics -- Public and Private Action -- The Site of Justice is not Where it Gets Caused -- Prior Principles, Self-Respect, and Equality -- Incentives and Prerogatives -- Pogge's Mastergoals and Supergoals -- Pogge's Failure to Address the Standard Case -- The Currency of Distributive Justice and Incentive Inequality.

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