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An introduction to the theory of knowledge / Dan O'Brien.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA : Polity Press, 2006Description: xii, 212 pages : illustrations ; 26 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 0745633161
  • 9780745633169
  • 074563317X
  • 9780745633176
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 121 22
LOC classification:
  • BD237 .O27 2006
Contents:
Part I. Introduction To Knowledge -- Section 1. The Theory of Knowledge -- 1. Epistemology -- 2. The Structure of the Book -- 2.1. Part I: Introduction to Knowledge -- 2.2. Part II: Sources of Knowledge -- 2.3. Part III: Justification -- 2.4. Part IV: Scepticism -- 2.5. Part V: Areas of Knowledge -- 3. Further Reading and Study -- Section 2. What Is Knowledge? -- 1. Philosophical Analysis -- 2. The Tripartite Definition of Knowledge -- 3. Are Justification and Belief Necessary for Knowledge? -- 4. Gettier Cases -- 5. Richer Notions of Justification -- 5.1. Infallibility -- 5.2. No False Beliefs -- 6. Knowledge as Basic -- 7. Family Resemblance -- Part II. Sources of Knowledge -- Section 3. A Priori Knowledge -- 1. Knowledge, Reason and Experience -- 2. Rationalism and Empiricism -- 3. The Synthetic A Priori -- 4. Self-Evidence and Certainty -- 5. Innate Knowledge -- Section 4. Perception -- 1. Direct Realism -- 2. Indirect Realism -- 2.1. The Argument From Illusion -- 2.2. Dualism -- 3. Rejecting Realism -- 3.1. Idealism -- 3.2. Phenomenalism -- 3.3. Problems for Phenomenalism -- 4. The Intentionalist Theory of Perception -- 4.1. Adverbialism -- 4.2. Intentionalism -- 4.3. Phenomenology -- 5. Seeing That, Seeing As, and Raw Seeing -- Section 5. Testimony -- 1. The Individualistic Approach to Knowledge -- 2. Testimony -- 3. Hume's Account of Testimony -- 3.1. The Problem of Circularity -- 3.2. The Martian Argument -- 4. Reid's Account of Testimony -- Part III. Justification -- Section 6. Foundationalism -- 1. The Regress Argument for Traditional Foundationalism -- 2. Sellars and the Myth of the Given -- 3. Conceptual and Non-Conceptual Content -- 4. Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument -- 5. Experience and Thought -- 6. Modest Foundationalism -- Section 7. Coherentism -- 1. A Holistic Conception of Justification -- 2. The Concept of Coherence -- 3. Problems for Coherentism -- 3.1. The Isolation Problem -- 3.2. Alternative Coherent Belief Systems -- 4. Coherence Theories of Truth -- 5. A Coherentist Account of Perception -- 6. A Thinker's Access to Her Own Belief System -- Section 8. Internalism and Externalism -- 1. Internalism -- 2. Externalism -- 2.1. The Basic Reliabilist Picture -- 2.2. Causal Accounts of Knowledge -- 2.3. Tracking Accounts of Knowledge -- 3. Arguments for Externalism -- 3.1. Non-Reflective Knowledge -- 3.2. An Epistemological Cure-All -- 4. Arguments Against Externalism -- 4.1. Knowledge and Rationally Motivated Action -- 4.2. Lucky Yet Reliable Beliefs -- 5. Two Kinds of Knowledge -- Part IV. Scepticism -- Section 9. Scepticism -- 1. Cartesian Scepticism -- 1.1. Dreams and the Demon -- 1.2. Descartes Goes to the Movies -- 2. Accepting Cartesian Scepticism -- 2.1. Withholding Belief -- 2.2. Dinner, Backgammon and Conversation -- 3. Contextualism -- 4. Cognitive Externalism -- 5. The Epistemological Externalist Response to Scepticism -- Section 10. The Problem of Induction -- 1. Inductive Inference -- 2. Hume's Inductive Scepticism -- 3. Responses to Inductive Scepticism -- 3.1. Popper's Deductive Conception of Science -- 3.2. Probability -- 3.3. The Reliabilist Response -- 3.4. The Coherentist Response -- 4. The New Riddle of Induction -- 5. Responses to the New Riddle of Induction -- 5.1. Simplicity -- 5.2. Grue is Not a Colour -- Section 11. Naturalized Epistemology -- 1. Quine and Epistemology -- 1.1. The Failure of Traditional Epistemology -- 1.2. Quine and Scepticism -- 1.3. Quine and the A Priori -- 2. The Normative Nature of Epistemology -- 3. Less Radical Forms of Naturalism -- Part V. Areas of Knowledge -- Section 12. Memory -- 1. Memory, Belief and Knowledge -- 2. Memory Images -- 3. The Causal Theory of Memory -- 4. Scepticism and the Reality of the Past -- 5. The Relation Between Perception, Testimony and Memory -- Section 13. Other Minds -- 1. First Person Authority -- 2. The Problem of Other Minds and Solipsism -- 3. The Argument From Analogy -- 4. Seeing Minds -- 5. The Private Language Argument Revisited -- 6. Behaviourism -- 7. Theoretical Knowledge of the Mind -- Section 14. Moral Knowledge -- 1. An Empirical Approach to Morality -- 1.1. Utilitarianism -- 1.2. Problems for Utilitarianism -- 2. An A Priori Approach to Morality -- 2.1. Kant and the Categorical Imperative -- 2.2. Problems for Kant's Moral Theory -- 3. Moral Testimony -- 4. Moral Scepticism -- 4.1. Relativism -- 4.2. Emotivism -- Section 15. God -- 1. An A Priori Proof for the Existence of God: The Ontological Argument -- 2. Empirical Justification for Religious Belief -- 2.1. The Argument From Design -- 2.2. The Argument From Miracles -- 2.3. Hume on Miracles -- 3. Perceiving God -- 4. Pascal's Wager -- 5. Scepticism, Atheism and Agnosticism.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 194-203) and index.

Part I. Introduction To Knowledge -- Section 1. The Theory of Knowledge -- 1. Epistemology -- 2. The Structure of the Book -- 2.1. Part I: Introduction to Knowledge -- 2.2. Part II: Sources of Knowledge -- 2.3. Part III: Justification -- 2.4. Part IV: Scepticism -- 2.5. Part V: Areas of Knowledge -- 3. Further Reading and Study -- Section 2. What Is Knowledge? -- 1. Philosophical Analysis -- 2. The Tripartite Definition of Knowledge -- 3. Are Justification and Belief Necessary for Knowledge? -- 4. Gettier Cases -- 5. Richer Notions of Justification -- 5.1. Infallibility -- 5.2. No False Beliefs -- 6. Knowledge as Basic -- 7. Family Resemblance -- Part II. Sources of Knowledge -- Section 3. A Priori Knowledge -- 1. Knowledge, Reason and Experience -- 2. Rationalism and Empiricism -- 3. The Synthetic A Priori -- 4. Self-Evidence and Certainty -- 5. Innate Knowledge -- Section 4. Perception -- 1. Direct Realism -- 2. Indirect Realism -- 2.1. The Argument From Illusion -- 2.2. Dualism -- 3. Rejecting Realism -- 3.1. Idealism -- 3.2. Phenomenalism -- 3.3. Problems for Phenomenalism -- 4. The Intentionalist Theory of Perception -- 4.1. Adverbialism -- 4.2. Intentionalism -- 4.3. Phenomenology -- 5. Seeing That, Seeing As, and Raw Seeing -- Section 5. Testimony -- 1. The Individualistic Approach to Knowledge -- 2. Testimony -- 3. Hume's Account of Testimony -- 3.1. The Problem of Circularity -- 3.2. The Martian Argument -- 4. Reid's Account of Testimony -- Part III. Justification -- Section 6. Foundationalism -- 1. The Regress Argument for Traditional Foundationalism -- 2. Sellars and the Myth of the Given -- 3. Conceptual and Non-Conceptual Content -- 4. Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument -- 5. Experience and Thought -- 6. Modest Foundationalism -- Section 7. Coherentism -- 1. A Holistic Conception of Justification -- 2. The Concept of Coherence -- 3. Problems for Coherentism -- 3.1. The Isolation Problem -- 3.2. Alternative Coherent Belief Systems -- 4. Coherence Theories of Truth -- 5. A Coherentist Account of Perception -- 6. A Thinker's Access to Her Own Belief System -- Section 8. Internalism and Externalism -- 1. Internalism -- 2. Externalism -- 2.1. The Basic Reliabilist Picture -- 2.2. Causal Accounts of Knowledge -- 2.3. Tracking Accounts of Knowledge -- 3. Arguments for Externalism -- 3.1. Non-Reflective Knowledge -- 3.2. An Epistemological Cure-All -- 4. Arguments Against Externalism -- 4.1. Knowledge and Rationally Motivated Action -- 4.2. Lucky Yet Reliable Beliefs -- 5. Two Kinds of Knowledge -- Part IV. Scepticism -- Section 9. Scepticism -- 1. Cartesian Scepticism -- 1.1. Dreams and the Demon -- 1.2. Descartes Goes to the Movies -- 2. Accepting Cartesian Scepticism -- 2.1. Withholding Belief -- 2.2. Dinner, Backgammon and Conversation -- 3. Contextualism -- 4. Cognitive Externalism -- 5. The Epistemological Externalist Response to Scepticism -- Section 10. The Problem of Induction -- 1. Inductive Inference -- 2. Hume's Inductive Scepticism -- 3. Responses to Inductive Scepticism -- 3.1. Popper's Deductive Conception of Science -- 3.2. Probability -- 3.3. The Reliabilist Response -- 3.4. The Coherentist Response -- 4. The New Riddle of Induction -- 5. Responses to the New Riddle of Induction -- 5.1. Simplicity -- 5.2. Grue is Not a Colour -- Section 11. Naturalized Epistemology -- 1. Quine and Epistemology -- 1.1. The Failure of Traditional Epistemology -- 1.2. Quine and Scepticism -- 1.3. Quine and the A Priori -- 2. The Normative Nature of Epistemology -- 3. Less Radical Forms of Naturalism -- Part V. Areas of Knowledge -- Section 12. Memory -- 1. Memory, Belief and Knowledge -- 2. Memory Images -- 3. The Causal Theory of Memory -- 4. Scepticism and the Reality of the Past -- 5. The Relation Between Perception, Testimony and Memory -- Section 13. Other Minds -- 1. First Person Authority -- 2. The Problem of Other Minds and Solipsism -- 3. The Argument From Analogy -- 4. Seeing Minds -- 5. The Private Language Argument Revisited -- 6. Behaviourism -- 7. Theoretical Knowledge of the Mind -- Section 14. Moral Knowledge -- 1. An Empirical Approach to Morality -- 1.1. Utilitarianism -- 1.2. Problems for Utilitarianism -- 2. An A Priori Approach to Morality -- 2.1. Kant and the Categorical Imperative -- 2.2. Problems for Kant's Moral Theory -- 3. Moral Testimony -- 4. Moral Scepticism -- 4.1. Relativism -- 4.2. Emotivism -- Section 15. God -- 1. An A Priori Proof for the Existence of God: The Ontological Argument -- 2. Empirical Justification for Religious Belief -- 2.1. The Argument From Design -- 2.2. The Argument From Miracles -- 2.3. Hume on Miracles -- 3. Perceiving God -- 4. Pascal's Wager -- 5. Scepticism, Atheism and Agnosticism.

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