Institutions and the path to the modern economy : lessons from medieval trade / Avner Greif.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 453-488) and index.

1. Introduction -- 2. Institutions and transactions -- 3. Private-order contract enforcement institutions : the Maghribi traders' coalition -- 4. Securing property rights from the grabbing hand of the state : the merchant guild -- 5. Endogenous institutions and game-theoretic analysis -- 6. A theory of endogenous institutional change -- 7. Institutional trajectories : how past institutions affect current ones -- 8. Building a state : Genoa's rise and fall -- 9. On the origin of distinct institutional trajectories : cultural beliefs and the organization of society -- 10. The institutional foundations of impersonal exchange -- 11. Interactive, context-specific analysis -- 12. Institutions, history, and development -- App. A. A primer in game theory -- App. B. Is homo sociologicus strategic? -- App. C. The role of theory : reputation-based private-order institutions.

"It is widely believed that current disparities in economic, political, and social outcomes reflect distinct institutions. Institutions are invoked to explain why some countries are rich and others poor, some democratic and others dictatorial. But arguments of this sort gloss over the question of what institutions are, how they come about, and why they persist. They also fail to explain why institutions are influenced by the past, why it is that they can sometimes change, why they differ so much from society to society, and why it is hard to study them empirically and devise a policy aimed at altering them. This book seeks to overcome these problems, which have exercised economists, sociologists, political scientists, and a host of other researchers who use the social sciences to study history, law, and business administration. It presents a multi-disciplinary perspective to study endogenous institutions and their dynamics."--Publisher.

Machine converted from AACR2 source record.