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Ethics done right : practical reasoning as a foundation for moral theory / Elijah Millgram.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2005Description: x, 344 pages ; 24 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 0521839432
  • 9780521839433
  • 0521548268
  • 9780521548267
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 170 22
LOC classification:
  • BJ1012 .M545 2005
Contents:
The method of practical reasoning -- What's the use of utility? -- Mill's proof of the principle of utility -- Does the categorical imperative give rise to a contradiction in the will? -- Reasonably virtuous -- Murdoch, practical reasoning, and particularism -- Was Hume a Humean? -- Hume on "is" and "ought" -- Hume, political noncognitivism, and the History of England -- Incommensurability and practical reasoning -- Commensurability in perspective -- Varieties of practical reasoning and varieties of moral theory -- --
Introduction : the method of practical reasoning -- 1. What's the use of utility? -- 2. Mill's proof of the principle of utility -- 3. Does the categorical imperative give rise to a contradiction in the will? -- 4. Reasonably virtuous -- 5. Murdoch, practical reasoning, and particularism -- 6. Was Hume a Humean? -- 7. Hume on "is" and "ought" -- 8. Hume, political noncognitivism, and the History of England -- 9. Incommensurability and practical reasoning -- 10. Commensurability in perspective -- 11. Varieties of practical reasoning and varieties of moral theory.
Review: "Ethics Done Right examines how practical reasoning can be put into the service of ethical and moral theory. Elijah Millgram shows that the key to thinking about ethics is to understand more generally how to make decisions. The papers in this volume support a methodological approach and trace the connections between two kinds of theory in utilitarianism, in Kantian ethics, in virtue ethics, in Hume's moral philosophy, and in moral particularism. Ethics Done Right does not advocate a particular moral theory. Rather, it offers a tool that enables one to decide for oneself."--BOOK JACKET.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 327-338) and index.

The method of practical reasoning -- What's the use of utility? -- Mill's proof of the principle of utility -- Does the categorical imperative give rise to a contradiction in the will? -- Reasonably virtuous -- Murdoch, practical reasoning, and particularism -- Was Hume a Humean? -- Hume on "is" and "ought" -- Hume, political noncognitivism, and the History of England -- Incommensurability and practical reasoning -- Commensurability in perspective -- Varieties of practical reasoning and varieties of moral theory -- --

Introduction : the method of practical reasoning -- 1. What's the use of utility? -- 2. Mill's proof of the principle of utility -- 3. Does the categorical imperative give rise to a contradiction in the will? -- 4. Reasonably virtuous -- 5. Murdoch, practical reasoning, and particularism -- 6. Was Hume a Humean? -- 7. Hume on "is" and "ought" -- 8. Hume, political noncognitivism, and the History of England -- 9. Incommensurability and practical reasoning -- 10. Commensurability in perspective -- 11. Varieties of practical reasoning and varieties of moral theory.

"Ethics Done Right examines how practical reasoning can be put into the service of ethical and moral theory. Elijah Millgram shows that the key to thinking about ethics is to understand more generally how to make decisions. The papers in this volume support a methodological approach and trace the connections between two kinds of theory in utilitarianism, in Kantian ethics, in virtue ethics, in Hume's moral philosophy, and in moral particularism. Ethics Done Right does not advocate a particular moral theory. Rather, it offers a tool that enables one to decide for oneself."--BOOK JACKET.

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