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Justifying blame : why free will matters and why it does not / Maureen Sie.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Value inquiry book series ; v. 166. | Value inquiry book series. Studies in applied ethics.Publisher: Amsterdam ; New York : Rodopi, 2005Description: xix, 132 pages ; 22 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 9042017449
  • 9789042017443
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 170
LOC classification:
  • BJ1451 .S53 2005
Partial contents:
Editorial foreword / by Gerhold K. Becker -- Foreword / by Paul Russell -- Responsibility, determinism, and freedom -- Practical compatibilism and ultimacy pessimism -- Freedom and blameworthy actions -- Blameworthy actions and normative disagreements -- Ultimacy pessimism and the question of authority -- Glossary -- --
Editorial foreword / Gerhold K. Becker -- Foreword / Paul Russell -- 1. Responsibility, determinism, and freedom -- 2. Practical compatibilism and ultimacy pessimism -- 3. Freedom and blameworthy actions -- 4. Blameworthy actions and normative disagreements -- 5. Ultimacy pessimism and the question of authority.
Review: "This book shows why we can justify blaming people for their wrong actions even if free will turns out not to exist. Contrary to most contemporary thinking, we do this by focusing on the ordinary, everyday wrongs each of us commits, not on the extra-ordinary, "morally monstrous-like" crimes and weak-willed actions of some."--BOOK JACKET.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 115-120) and index.

Editorial foreword / by Gerhold K. Becker -- Foreword / by Paul Russell -- Responsibility, determinism, and freedom -- Practical compatibilism and ultimacy pessimism -- Freedom and blameworthy actions -- Blameworthy actions and normative disagreements -- Ultimacy pessimism and the question of authority -- Glossary -- --

Editorial foreword / Gerhold K. Becker -- Foreword / Paul Russell -- 1. Responsibility, determinism, and freedom -- 2. Practical compatibilism and ultimacy pessimism -- 3. Freedom and blameworthy actions -- 4. Blameworthy actions and normative disagreements -- 5. Ultimacy pessimism and the question of authority.

"This book shows why we can justify blaming people for their wrong actions even if free will turns out not to exist. Contrary to most contemporary thinking, we do this by focusing on the ordinary, everyday wrongs each of us commits, not on the extra-ordinary, "morally monstrous-like" crimes and weak-willed actions of some."--BOOK JACKET.

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