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Intellectual trust in oneself and others / Richard Foley.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Cambridge studies in philosophyPublisher: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001Description: x, 182 pages ; 24 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 0521793084
  • 9780521793087
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 121.6 21
LOC classification:
  • BD161 .F565 2001
Online resources:
Contents:
Pt. 1. Intellectual Trust in Oneself. 1. The Importance of Intellectual Self-Trust. 1. Classical foundationalism and intellectual trust. 2. Attempts to refute skepticism. 3. Externalism and the analysis of knowledge. 4. Epistemology, theology, and natural selection. 5. Epistemology and the leap of intellectual faith. 2. Intellectual Self-Trust, Rational Belief, and Invulnerability to Self-Criticism. 1. Confidence and depth. 2. Rational belief as invulnerability to self-criticism. 3. Two thought experiments. 4. Self-trust and inconsistency. 5. Rationality and less than ideal outcomes. 3. Empirical Challenges to Self-Trust. 1. Studies documenting our tendencies to make errors. 2. First-person epistemological issues raised by the studies. 3. Self-monitoring. 4. The limits of self-monitoring. 5. The lack of guarantees. 6. Internal conflict and conflict with others -- Pt. 2. Intellectual Trust in Others and in One's Own Future and Past Self. 4. Self-Trust and the Authority of Others. 1. Epistemic egotism and epistemic egoism. 2. Locke on the authority of others. 3. The social construction of opinion. 4. The incoherence of epistemic egotism and egoism. 5. Intellectual conflict with others. 6. Anonymous reconsidered. 7. Egalitarianism and expert opinion. 8. Individualism and autonomy. 5. Past Opinion and Current Opinion. 1. The diary problem. 2. Three theses about past opinion. 3. An attempt to motivate the credibility thesis. 4. The incoherence of not trusting past opinion. 5. Differences in the credibility of past opinions. 6. The priority thesis and the special reason thesis. 7. Radical conflicts with one's own past opinions. 8. Past opinions and the opinions of others. 6. Future Opinion and Current Opinion. 1. Epistemic Ulysses problems. 2. Trust in future opinion. 3. Reasons for believing that I will believe P. 4. Conflicts between current and future opinions. 5. Future opinions and current deliberations. 6. Self-trust radiates outward.
Review: "This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the center of intellectual trust."--BOOK JACKET.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

Pt. 1. Intellectual Trust in Oneself. 1. The Importance of Intellectual Self-Trust. 1. Classical foundationalism and intellectual trust. 2. Attempts to refute skepticism. 3. Externalism and the analysis of knowledge. 4. Epistemology, theology, and natural selection. 5. Epistemology and the leap of intellectual faith. 2. Intellectual Self-Trust, Rational Belief, and Invulnerability to Self-Criticism. 1. Confidence and depth. 2. Rational belief as invulnerability to self-criticism. 3. Two thought experiments. 4. Self-trust and inconsistency. 5. Rationality and less than ideal outcomes. 3. Empirical Challenges to Self-Trust. 1. Studies documenting our tendencies to make errors. 2. First-person epistemological issues raised by the studies. 3. Self-monitoring. 4. The limits of self-monitoring. 5. The lack of guarantees. 6. Internal conflict and conflict with others -- Pt. 2. Intellectual Trust in Others and in One's Own Future and Past Self. 4. Self-Trust and the Authority of Others. 1. Epistemic egotism and epistemic egoism. 2. Locke on the authority of others. 3. The social construction of opinion. 4. The incoherence of epistemic egotism and egoism. 5. Intellectual conflict with others. 6. Anonymous reconsidered. 7. Egalitarianism and expert opinion. 8. Individualism and autonomy. 5. Past Opinion and Current Opinion. 1. The diary problem. 2. Three theses about past opinion. 3. An attempt to motivate the credibility thesis. 4. The incoherence of not trusting past opinion. 5. Differences in the credibility of past opinions. 6. The priority thesis and the special reason thesis. 7. Radical conflicts with one's own past opinions. 8. Past opinions and the opinions of others. 6. Future Opinion and Current Opinion. 1. Epistemic Ulysses problems. 2. Trust in future opinion. 3. Reasons for believing that I will believe P. 4. Conflicts between current and future opinions. 5. Future opinions and current deliberations. 6. Self-trust radiates outward.

"This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the center of intellectual trust."--BOOK JACKET.

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