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We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud : intelligence on Iraq's WMD / by Ron Huisken.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Working paper (Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre) ; 390.Publisher: Canberra : Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2004Description: 76 pages ; 21 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 0731554574
  • 9780731554577
Other title:
  • Intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
Subject(s): Additional physical formats: Online version:: We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.DDC classification:
  • 327.120973 22
LOC classification:
  • UA870 .A9 no.390 2004
Summary: "In the second half of 2002, when the US intelligence community was tasked to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD capacities, the administration had been already been saying for over six months that Iraq under Saddam posed an intolerable risk that the US was determined to address. In other words, intelligence was catching up with policy. Moreover, the administration's determination to proceed in the face of widespread opposition meant that the stakes in terms of US credibility and prestige were seen in Washington as having become dauntingly large. In the event, the intelligence community slid over the fact that it had too few 'dots' to make confident judgments on WMD in Iraq."--Abstract from SDSC web site.Abstract: "In the second half of 2002, when the US intelligence community was tasked to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD capacities, the administration had been already been saying for over six months that Iraq under Saddam posed an intolerable risk that the US was determined to address. In other words, intelligence was catching up with policy. Moreover, the administration's determination to proceed in the face of widespread opposition meant that the stakes in terms of US credibility and prestige were seen in Washington as having become dauntingly large. In the event, the intelligence community slid over the fact that it had too few 'dots' to make confident judgments on WMD in Iraq."--Abstract from SDSC web site.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Copy number Status Date due Barcode
Book City Campus City Campus Main Collection 327.120973 HUI (Browse shelf(Opens below)) 1 Available A297964B

"June, 2004.".

Includes bibliographical references.

"In the second half of 2002, when the US intelligence community was tasked to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD capacities, the administration had been already been saying for over six months that Iraq under Saddam posed an intolerable risk that the US was determined to address. In other words, intelligence was catching up with policy. Moreover, the administration's determination to proceed in the face of widespread opposition meant that the stakes in terms of US credibility and prestige were seen in Washington as having become dauntingly large. In the event, the intelligence community slid over the fact that it had too few 'dots' to make confident judgments on WMD in Iraq."--Abstract from SDSC web site.

"In the second half of 2002, when the US intelligence community was tasked to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD capacities, the administration had been already been saying for over six months that Iraq under Saddam posed an intolerable risk that the US was determined to address. In other words, intelligence was catching up with policy. Moreover, the administration's determination to proceed in the face of widespread opposition meant that the stakes in terms of US credibility and prestige were seen in Washington as having become dauntingly large. In the event, the intelligence community slid over the fact that it had too few 'dots' to make confident judgments on WMD in Iraq."--Abstract from SDSC web site.

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