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The economics of rights, co-operation, and welfare / Robert Sugden.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: New York : Palgrave Macmillan, [2005]Copyright date: ©2005Edition: Second editionDescription: xiv, 243 pages : illustrations ; 22 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 0333682394
  • 9780333682395
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 330.1 22
LOC classification:
  • HB95 .S84 2005
Online resources:
Contents:
1. Spontaneous order -- 2. Games -- 3. Coordination -- 4. Property -- 5. Possession -- 6. Reciprocity -- 7. Free riders -- 8. Natural law -- 9. Rights, co-operation and welfare.
Review: "In The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, Robert Sugden sets out to answer a question that lies at the heart of economics and politics: how can individuals coordinate their behaviour in the absence of central law-enforcing agencies? Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, Sugden shows how self-enforcing conventions of property and reciprocity can evolve spontaneously out of the interactions of self-interested individuals. He goes on to argue that such conventions tend to become norms, even if they arbitrarily favour some people relative to others, and even if they do not maximize social welfare."--BOOK JACKET.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Copy number Status Date due Barcode
Book City Campus City Campus Main Collection 330.1 SUG (Browse shelf(Opens below)) 1 Available A412232B

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Spontaneous order -- 2. Games -- 3. Coordination -- 4. Property -- 5. Possession -- 6. Reciprocity -- 7. Free riders -- 8. Natural law -- 9. Rights, co-operation and welfare.

"In The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, Robert Sugden sets out to answer a question that lies at the heart of economics and politics: how can individuals coordinate their behaviour in the absence of central law-enforcing agencies? Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, Sugden shows how self-enforcing conventions of property and reciprocity can evolve spontaneously out of the interactions of self-interested individuals. He goes on to argue that such conventions tend to become norms, even if they arbitrarily favour some people relative to others, and even if they do not maximize social welfare."--BOOK JACKET.

Machine converted from AACR2 source record.

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