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Fair division and collective welfare / Hervé Moulin.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, [2003]Copyright date: ©2003Description: 289 pages ; 24 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 0262134233
  • 9780262134231
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 330.126 21
LOC classification:
  • HB846 .M68 2003
Contents:
1. Microeconomic Foundations -- 1.1. Fairness: Equal and Unequal Treatment -- 1.2. Collective Welfare: Cardinal -- 1.3. Collective Welfare: Ordinal -- 1.4. Externalities and Fair Division -- 1.5. Private versus Public Contracts -- 1.6. Organization and Overview of the Book -- 2. Fair Distribution -- 2.1. Four Principles of Distributive Justice -- 2.2. A Simple Model of Fair Distribution -- 2.3. Contested Garment Method -- 2.4. Equal Sacrifice in Taxation -- 2.5. Sum-Fitness and Equality -- 3. Cardinal Welfarism -- 3.1. Welfarism -- 3.2. Additive Collective Utility Functions -- 3.3. Egalitarianism and the Leximin Social Welfare Ordering -- 3.4. Comparing Classical Utilitarianism, Nash, and Leximin -- 3.5. Failures of Monotonicity -- 3.6. Bargaining Compromise -- 4. Voting and Social Choice -- 4.1. Ordinal Welfarism -- 4.2. Condorcet versus Borda -- 4.3. Voting over Resource Allocation -- 4.4. Single-Peaked Preferences -- 4.5. Intermediate Preferences -- 4.6. Preference Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem.
Review: "The book begins with the epistemological status of the axiomatic approach and the four classic principles of distributive justice: compensation, reward, exogenous rights, and fitness. It then presents the simple ideas of equal gains, equal losses, and proportional gains and losses. The book discusses there cardinal interpretations of collective welfare: Bentham's "utilitarian" proposal to maximize the sum of individual utilities, the Nash product, and the egalitarian leximin ordering. It also discusses the two main ordinal definitions of collective welfare: the majority relation and the Borda scoring method." "The Shapley value is the single most important contribution of game theory to distributive justice. A formula to divide jointly produced costs or benefits fairly, it is especially useful when the pattern of externalities renders useless the simple ideas of equality and proportionality. The book ends with two versatile methods for dividing commodities efficiently and fairly when only ordinal preferences matter: competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and egalitarian equivalence. The book contains a wealth of empirical examples and exercises."--BOOK JACKET.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Copy number Status Date due Barcode
Book City Campus City Campus Main Collection 330.126 MOU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) 1 Issued 02/10/2024 A412130B

Includes bibliographical references (pages 277-280) and index.

1. Microeconomic Foundations -- 1.1. Fairness: Equal and Unequal Treatment -- 1.2. Collective Welfare: Cardinal -- 1.3. Collective Welfare: Ordinal -- 1.4. Externalities and Fair Division -- 1.5. Private versus Public Contracts -- 1.6. Organization and Overview of the Book -- 2. Fair Distribution -- 2.1. Four Principles of Distributive Justice -- 2.2. A Simple Model of Fair Distribution -- 2.3. Contested Garment Method -- 2.4. Equal Sacrifice in Taxation -- 2.5. Sum-Fitness and Equality -- 3. Cardinal Welfarism -- 3.1. Welfarism -- 3.2. Additive Collective Utility Functions -- 3.3. Egalitarianism and the Leximin Social Welfare Ordering -- 3.4. Comparing Classical Utilitarianism, Nash, and Leximin -- 3.5. Failures of Monotonicity -- 3.6. Bargaining Compromise -- 4. Voting and Social Choice -- 4.1. Ordinal Welfarism -- 4.2. Condorcet versus Borda -- 4.3. Voting over Resource Allocation -- 4.4. Single-Peaked Preferences -- 4.5. Intermediate Preferences -- 4.6. Preference Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem.

"The book begins with the epistemological status of the axiomatic approach and the four classic principles of distributive justice: compensation, reward, exogenous rights, and fitness. It then presents the simple ideas of equal gains, equal losses, and proportional gains and losses. The book discusses there cardinal interpretations of collective welfare: Bentham's "utilitarian" proposal to maximize the sum of individual utilities, the Nash product, and the egalitarian leximin ordering. It also discusses the two main ordinal definitions of collective welfare: the majority relation and the Borda scoring method." "The Shapley value is the single most important contribution of game theory to distributive justice. A formula to divide jointly produced costs or benefits fairly, it is especially useful when the pattern of externalities renders useless the simple ideas of equality and proportionality. The book ends with two versatile methods for dividing commodities efficiently and fairly when only ordinal preferences matter: competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and egalitarian equivalence. The book contains a wealth of empirical examples and exercises."--BOOK JACKET.

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