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Trust / edited by Elias L. Khalil.

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Critical studies in economic institutions ; 3. | Elgar reference collectionPublisher: Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Pub, [2003]Copyright date: ©2003Description: xxxii, 772 pages : illustrations ; 25 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 184064737X
  • 9781840647372
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 330.01 21
LOC classification:
  • HF1721 .T745 2003
Contents:
Acknowledgements -- Introduction: Why Does Trustworthiness Pay? Three Answers -- 1. Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma -- 2. The Further Evolution of Cooperation -- 3. There are Many Evolutionary Pathways to Cooperation -- 4. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange -- 5. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma' -- 6. Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game -- 7. Neither Friends nor Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting in French Industry -- 8. Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum -- 9. The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust -- 10. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild -- 11. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization -- 12. Trust, Opportunism and Governance: A Process and Control Model -- 13. On the Emotional Character of Trust -- 14. Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity -- 15. Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results -- 16. Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study -- 17. In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies -- 18. Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments -- 19. Cooperation -- 20. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History -- 21. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination -- 22. Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market -- 23. Labor Contracts as a Partial Gift Exchange -- 24. Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics -- 25. Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments -- 26. The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception -- 27. Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory -- 28. Sentimental Fools: A Critique of Amartya Sen's Notion of Commitment -- 29. Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts -- 30. Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust -- 31. Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach -- 32. Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality -- 33. If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? -- 34. On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises -- 35. The Value of a Smile: Game Theory with a Human Face -- 36. An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining -- Name Index.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Call number Copy number Status Date due Barcode
Book City Campus City Campus Main Collection 330.01 TRU (Browse shelf(Opens below)) 1 Available A289117B

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Acknowledgements -- Introduction: Why Does Trustworthiness Pay? Three Answers -- 1. Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma -- 2. The Further Evolution of Cooperation -- 3. There are Many Evolutionary Pathways to Cooperation -- 4. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange -- 5. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma' -- 6. Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game -- 7. Neither Friends nor Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting in French Industry -- 8. Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum -- 9. The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust -- 10. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild -- 11. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization -- 12. Trust, Opportunism and Governance: A Process and Control Model -- 13. On the Emotional Character of Trust -- 14. Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity -- 15. Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results -- 16. Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study -- 17. In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies -- 18. Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments -- 19. Cooperation -- 20. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History -- 21. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination -- 22. Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market -- 23. Labor Contracts as a Partial Gift Exchange -- 24. Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics -- 25. Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments -- 26. The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception -- 27. Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory -- 28. Sentimental Fools: A Critique of Amartya Sen's Notion of Commitment -- 29. Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts -- 30. Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust -- 31. Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach -- 32. Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality -- 33. If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? -- 34. On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises -- 35. The Value of a Smile: Game Theory with a Human Face -- 36. An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining -- Name Index.

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