Strategic choice and international relations / edited by David A. Lake and Robert Powell.

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextPublisher: Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1999Description: 271 pages ; 24 cmContent type:

text

Media type:

unmediated

Carrier type:

volume

ISBN:

069102698X
9780691026985
0691026971
9780691026978

Subject(s):

DDC classification:

327.101 21

LOC classification:

JZ1305 .S765 1999

Contents:

International relations: a strategic-choice approach / David A. Lake and Robert Powell -- Actors and preferences in international relations / Jeffry A. Frieden -- The strategic setting of choices: signaling, commitment and negotiation in international politics / James D. Morrow -- Institutions as constraints on strategic choice / Ronald Rogowski -- The governance problem in international relations / Peter Alexis Gourevitch -- Evolution, choice, and international change / Miles Kahler -- The limits of strategic choice: constrained rationality and incomplete explanation / Arthur A. Stein -- --

Acknowledgments -- Ch. 1. International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach -- Ch. 2. Actors and Preferences in International Relations -- Ch. 3. The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics -- Ch. 4. Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice -- Ch. 5. The Governance Problem in International Relations -- Ch. 6. Evolution, Choice, and International Change -- Ch. 7. The Limits of Strategic Choice: Constrained Rationality and Incomplete Explanation -- References -- About the Authors -- Name Index -- General Index.

Summary: "The strategic-choice approach has a long pedigree in international relations. In an area often rent by competing methodologies, editors David A. Lake and Robert Powell take the best of accepted and contested knowledge among many theories. With the contributors to this volume, they offer a unifying perspective, which begins with a simple insight: students of international relations want to explain the choices actors make--whether these actors be states, parties, ethnic groups, companies, leaders, or individuals.This synthesis offers three new benefits: first, the strategic interaction of actors is the unit of analysis, rather than particular states or policies; second, these interactions are now usefully organized into analytic schemes, on which conceptual experiments may be based; and third, a set of methodological "bets" is then made about the most productive ways to analyze the interactions. Together, these elements allow the pragmatic application of theories that may apply to a myriad of particular cases, such as individuals protesting environmental degradation, governments seeking to control nuclear weapons, or the United Nations attempting to mobilize member states for international peacekeeping. Besides the editors, the six contributors to this book, all distinguished scholars of international relations, are Jeffry A. Frieden, James D. Morrow, Ronald Rogowski, Peter Gourevitch, Miles Kahler, and Arthur A. Stein. Their work is an invaluable introduction for scholars and students of international relations, economists, and government decision-makers."--Publisher description.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Copy number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Book	City Campus City Campus Main Collection	327.101 STR (Browse shelf(Opens below))	1	Available		A249683B

Includes bibliographical references and index.

"The strategic-choice approach has a long pedigree in international relations. In an area often rent by competing methodologies, editors David A. Lake and Robert Powell take the best of accepted and contested knowledge among many theories. With the contributors to this volume, they offer a unifying perspective, which begins with a simple insight: students of international relations want to explain the choices actors make--whether these actors be states, parties, ethnic groups, companies, leaders, or individuals.This synthesis offers three new benefits: first, the strategic interaction of actors is the unit of analysis, rather than particular states or policies; second, these interactions are now usefully organized into analytic schemes, on which conceptual experiments may be based; and third, a set of methodological "bets" is then made about the most productive ways to analyze the interactions. Together, these elements allow the pragmatic application of theories that may apply to a myriad of particular cases, such as individuals protesting environmental degradation, governments seeking to control nuclear weapons, or the United Nations attempting to mobilize member states for international peacekeeping. Besides the editors, the six contributors to this book, all distinguished scholars of international relations, are Jeffry A. Frieden, James D. Morrow, Ronald Rogowski, Peter Gourevitch, Miles Kahler, and Arthur A. Stein. Their work is an invaluable introduction for scholars and students of international relations, economists, and government decision-makers."--Publisher description.

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