Bicameralism / George Tsebelis, Jeannette Money.
Material type: TextSeries: Political economy of institutions and decisionsPublisher: Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997Description: xiv, 250 pages ; 24 cmContent type:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 0521580374
- 9780521580373
- 052158972X
- 9780521589727
- 328.3 20
- JF541 .T76 1997
Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Book | City Campus City Campus Main Collection | 328.3 TSE (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | Available | A155490B |
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328.1 HER Parliament and elections in New Zealand. | 328.1852 NOT Japanese agricultural policies : the ABARE study and beef and dairy policies / | 328.293 REF Referendums : constitutional and political perspectives / | 328.3 TSE Bicameralism / | 328.3340993 TEM Making your vote count : referendum '92 : a guide to electoral reform / | 328.3340993 TEM Making your vote count : referendum '92 : a guide to electoral reform / | 328.33470993 BOS Governing under proportional representation : lessons from Europe / |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 233-242) and index.
Part I. History and Geography of Bicameral Diversity: -- 1. Bicameralism in historical perspective -- 2. The institutions of bicameralism -- Part II. Models of Bicameral Institutions: -- 3. The core and the uncovered set of bicameral institutions -- 4. A Model of intercameral bargaining -- 5. A model of conference committees and their proposals -- Part III. Empirical Studies of Bicameralism and Implications: -- 6. The outcomes of intercameral bargaining -- 7. The process of intercameral bargaining -- 8. Conference committees -- 9. Implications -- Conclusions.
"This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments."--Publisher description.
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