The norm of belief /
Gibbons, John (Associate professor of philosophy)
The norm of belief / John Gibbons. - xv, 302 pages ; 24 cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. The Puzzle -- 2. Subjective and Objective "Oughts" -- 3. Blaming the Question -- 4. The Derivation -- 5. Teleology -- 6. Guidance -- 7. Access -- 8. Knowledge versus Truth -- 9. Moore -- 10. The Moore Conditionals -- -- The Puzzle -- Subjectivism -- Objectivism -- The first-person point of view -- The ambiguity theory -- The last resort: nihilism -- Summary -- -- Subjective and Objective "Oughts" -- The first proposal -- The second proposal -- The third proposal -- One more try -- -- Blaming the Question -- The regular "ought" -- The given -- Wide-scoping -- Contextualism -- Radical contextualism -- Incommensurability -- -- The Derivation -- Two kinds of objectivists -- The Bad Attempt -- Williamson -- Wedgwood -- -- Teleology -- The upside -- The limitations -- The main difficulty -- Variations -- -- Guidance -- Knowledge only -- The natural reaction -- Two kinds of guidance -- What difference does a mind make? -- Getting a grip -- Objective reasons to act -- Objective reasons to believe -- -- Access -- The constraint -- The regress -- Two explanations of privilege -- Worldly requirements -- Worldly explanations -- Explaining privilege -- Externalism and the love of Reason -- The options -- -- Knowledge versus Truth -- The practical case -- Commitment -- Defeaters -- Defining undermining -- Other possibilities -- The aim of belief -- The lottery -- Why knowledge? -- -- Moore -- Belief's own standards -- Taking a stand -- Commitment -- Incoherence without inconsistency -- The first pass -- The second pass -- Back to (0) -- What they have in common -- Knowledge -- Justification -- -- The Moore Conditionals -- The Moore Conditionals -- The objectivist intuitions -- General and particular -- The umbrella -- Inference from a false belief -- Moorean redundancy and triviality -- One kind of triviality -- Noninferential justification -- In between following and acting in accord -- First Order First -- Conclusion. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
"John Gibbons presents an original account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms. One task is to say where these standards come from. But the more basic task is to say what those standards are. In some sense, beliefs are supposed to be true. Perhaps they're supposed to constitute knowledge. And in some sense, they really ought to be reasonable. Which, if any of these is the fundamental norm of belief? The Norm of Belief argues against the teleological or instrumentalist conception of rationality that sees being reasonable as a means to our more objective aims, either knowledge or truth. And it tries to explain both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable. But the importance of being reasonable is not explained in terms of what it will get you, or what you think it will get you, or what it would get you if only things were different. The requirement to be reasonable comes from the very idea of what a genuine requirement is. That is where the built-in standards governing belief come from, and that is what they are."--Publisher's website.
019967339X 9780199673391
Belief and doubt.
BD215 / .G53 2013
121
The norm of belief / John Gibbons. - xv, 302 pages ; 24 cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. The Puzzle -- 2. Subjective and Objective "Oughts" -- 3. Blaming the Question -- 4. The Derivation -- 5. Teleology -- 6. Guidance -- 7. Access -- 8. Knowledge versus Truth -- 9. Moore -- 10. The Moore Conditionals -- -- The Puzzle -- Subjectivism -- Objectivism -- The first-person point of view -- The ambiguity theory -- The last resort: nihilism -- Summary -- -- Subjective and Objective "Oughts" -- The first proposal -- The second proposal -- The third proposal -- One more try -- -- Blaming the Question -- The regular "ought" -- The given -- Wide-scoping -- Contextualism -- Radical contextualism -- Incommensurability -- -- The Derivation -- Two kinds of objectivists -- The Bad Attempt -- Williamson -- Wedgwood -- -- Teleology -- The upside -- The limitations -- The main difficulty -- Variations -- -- Guidance -- Knowledge only -- The natural reaction -- Two kinds of guidance -- What difference does a mind make? -- Getting a grip -- Objective reasons to act -- Objective reasons to believe -- -- Access -- The constraint -- The regress -- Two explanations of privilege -- Worldly requirements -- Worldly explanations -- Explaining privilege -- Externalism and the love of Reason -- The options -- -- Knowledge versus Truth -- The practical case -- Commitment -- Defeaters -- Defining undermining -- Other possibilities -- The aim of belief -- The lottery -- Why knowledge? -- -- Moore -- Belief's own standards -- Taking a stand -- Commitment -- Incoherence without inconsistency -- The first pass -- The second pass -- Back to (0) -- What they have in common -- Knowledge -- Justification -- -- The Moore Conditionals -- The Moore Conditionals -- The objectivist intuitions -- General and particular -- The umbrella -- Inference from a false belief -- Moorean redundancy and triviality -- One kind of triviality -- Noninferential justification -- In between following and acting in accord -- First Order First -- Conclusion. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
"John Gibbons presents an original account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms. One task is to say where these standards come from. But the more basic task is to say what those standards are. In some sense, beliefs are supposed to be true. Perhaps they're supposed to constitute knowledge. And in some sense, they really ought to be reasonable. Which, if any of these is the fundamental norm of belief? The Norm of Belief argues against the teleological or instrumentalist conception of rationality that sees being reasonable as a means to our more objective aims, either knowledge or truth. And it tries to explain both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable. But the importance of being reasonable is not explained in terms of what it will get you, or what you think it will get you, or what it would get you if only things were different. The requirement to be reasonable comes from the very idea of what a genuine requirement is. That is where the built-in standards governing belief come from, and that is what they are."--Publisher's website.
019967339X 9780199673391
Belief and doubt.
BD215 / .G53 2013
121