A theory of the state : economic rights, legal rights, and the scope of the state /
Barzel, Yoram,
A theory of the state : economic rights, legal rights, and the scope of the state / Yoram Barzel. - xiii, 289 pages ; 24 cm. - Political economy of institutions and decisions . - Political economy of institutions and decisions. .
Includes bibliographical references (pages 277-281) and index.
Introduction -- The Emergence of Protection and Third-Party Enforcement. The State and the Enforcement of Agreements. Third-Party Enforcement and the State. The Choice among Enforcement Forms. Anonymous Exchange, Mixed Enforcement, and Vertical Integration. Jurisdictional Issues. Collective Action and Collective Decisions. Tying the Protector's Hands: The Agreement between Subjects and Protector -- The Emergence of Legal Institutions. Legal Rights. The State's Enhancement of Market Trade. The Size and Scope of the State -- The Character of the State. Merger and Local Autonomy. The Distinction between "Legitimate" and "Criminal" States. Power, Violent Conflict, and Political Evolution. The Time Path of Change under Dictatorships and under Rule-of-Law Regimes. Recapitulation and an Epilogue. 1. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 2. 9. 10. 11. 3. 11. 13. 14. 15. 16.
"This book models the emergence of the state and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals are expected to install rulers only after they have created mechanisms to control them. Among the offshoots of the organized protection are a legal system and decision-making procedures that include voting. The initial "state of nature," then, may gradually evolve into a rule-of-law state."--BOOK JACKET.
0521806054 9780521806053 0521000645 9780521000642
2001025951
State, The.
JC11 / .B385 2002
320.1
A theory of the state : economic rights, legal rights, and the scope of the state / Yoram Barzel. - xiii, 289 pages ; 24 cm. - Political economy of institutions and decisions . - Political economy of institutions and decisions. .
Includes bibliographical references (pages 277-281) and index.
Introduction -- The Emergence of Protection and Third-Party Enforcement. The State and the Enforcement of Agreements. Third-Party Enforcement and the State. The Choice among Enforcement Forms. Anonymous Exchange, Mixed Enforcement, and Vertical Integration. Jurisdictional Issues. Collective Action and Collective Decisions. Tying the Protector's Hands: The Agreement between Subjects and Protector -- The Emergence of Legal Institutions. Legal Rights. The State's Enhancement of Market Trade. The Size and Scope of the State -- The Character of the State. Merger and Local Autonomy. The Distinction between "Legitimate" and "Criminal" States. Power, Violent Conflict, and Political Evolution. The Time Path of Change under Dictatorships and under Rule-of-Law Regimes. Recapitulation and an Epilogue. 1. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 2. 9. 10. 11. 3. 11. 13. 14. 15. 16.
"This book models the emergence of the state and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals are expected to install rulers only after they have created mechanisms to control them. Among the offshoots of the organized protection are a legal system and decision-making procedures that include voting. The initial "state of nature," then, may gradually evolve into a rule-of-law state."--BOOK JACKET.
0521806054 9780521806053 0521000645 9780521000642
2001025951
State, The.
JC11 / .B385 2002
320.1