The economics of contracts : theories and applications /
The economics of contracts : theories and applications /
edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant.
- xvi, 584 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Includes revised and translated versions of chapters which appeared in a special issue of Revue d'économie industrielle (2002, 92).
Includes bibliographical references (pages 531-569) and index.
Introduction. The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics / Canonical models of theories of contract / Contracts, organizations, and institutions. The New Institutional Economics / Contract and economic organization / The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships / Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts / Law and economics. The contract as economic trade / Contract theory and theories of contract regulation / Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law: sale of an asset of uncertain value / A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights / Theoretical developments: where do we stand? Transaction costs and incentive theory / Norms and the theory of the firm / Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints / Complexity and contract / Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts / Positive agency theory: place and contributions / Testing contract theories. Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting / Experiments on moral hazard and incentives: reciprocity and surplus-sharing / Applied issues: contributions to industrial organization. Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts: substitutes or complements? / The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers / Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks: from strategic behaviors to property rights / Licensing in the chemical industry / Policy issues: anti-trust and regulation of public utilities. Inter-company agreements and EC competition law / Incentive contracts in utility regulation / Contractual choice and performance: the case of water supply in France / Institutional or structural: lessons from international electricity sector reforms / Electricity sector restructuring and competition: a transaction-cost perspective / Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michael Glachant -- M'hand Fares -- Ronald Coase. Oliver E. Williamson. Benjamin Klein. Eirik G. Furubotn -- Jacques Ghestin. Alan Schwartz. Victor P. Goldberg. Gary D. Libecap -- Eric Malin and David Martimort. Oliver Hart. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey. W. Bentley Macleod. Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser. Gerard Charreaux -- Scott E. Masten and Stephane Saussier. Claudia Keser and Marc Willinger -- Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud. Benito Arrunada. Godefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Penard. Ashish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri -- Michael Glais. Matthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price. Claude Menard and Stephane Saussier. Guy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller. Paul L. Joskow. Pt. I. 1. App. Pt. II. 2. 3. 4. 5. Pt. III. 6. 7. 8. 9. Pt. IV. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Pt. V. 16. 17. Pt. VI. 18. 19. 20. 21. Pt. VII. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
"A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this book provides an overview of the past and recent developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners."--Publisher description.
0521814901 9780521814904 0521893135 9780521893138
2002019300
Contracts--Economic aspects
K840 / .E28 2002
330.1
Includes revised and translated versions of chapters which appeared in a special issue of Revue d'économie industrielle (2002, 92).
Includes bibliographical references (pages 531-569) and index.
Introduction. The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics / Canonical models of theories of contract / Contracts, organizations, and institutions. The New Institutional Economics / Contract and economic organization / The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships / Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts / Law and economics. The contract as economic trade / Contract theory and theories of contract regulation / Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law: sale of an asset of uncertain value / A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights / Theoretical developments: where do we stand? Transaction costs and incentive theory / Norms and the theory of the firm / Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints / Complexity and contract / Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts / Positive agency theory: place and contributions / Testing contract theories. Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting / Experiments on moral hazard and incentives: reciprocity and surplus-sharing / Applied issues: contributions to industrial organization. Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts: substitutes or complements? / The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers / Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks: from strategic behaviors to property rights / Licensing in the chemical industry / Policy issues: anti-trust and regulation of public utilities. Inter-company agreements and EC competition law / Incentive contracts in utility regulation / Contractual choice and performance: the case of water supply in France / Institutional or structural: lessons from international electricity sector reforms / Electricity sector restructuring and competition: a transaction-cost perspective / Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michael Glachant -- M'hand Fares -- Ronald Coase. Oliver E. Williamson. Benjamin Klein. Eirik G. Furubotn -- Jacques Ghestin. Alan Schwartz. Victor P. Goldberg. Gary D. Libecap -- Eric Malin and David Martimort. Oliver Hart. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey. W. Bentley Macleod. Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser. Gerard Charreaux -- Scott E. Masten and Stephane Saussier. Claudia Keser and Marc Willinger -- Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud. Benito Arrunada. Godefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Penard. Ashish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri -- Michael Glais. Matthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price. Claude Menard and Stephane Saussier. Guy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller. Paul L. Joskow. Pt. I. 1. App. Pt. II. 2. 3. 4. 5. Pt. III. 6. 7. 8. 9. Pt. IV. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Pt. V. 16. 17. Pt. VI. 18. 19. 20. 21. Pt. VII. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
"A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this book provides an overview of the past and recent developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners."--Publisher description.
0521814901 9780521814904 0521893135 9780521893138
2002019300
Contracts--Economic aspects
K840 / .E28 2002
330.1